Ext 5000/41(6) 'PERSIAN SITUATION: MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS' [‎164v] (328/920)

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The Shah was not fully convinced,. He felt that recent events
•might have had a chastening effect on the deputies and that if
'•warned in addition they might behave properly in future. I
replied that deputies were like school of children and that the
effect of such warning would wear off in 24 hours. If the
deputies could be induced to vote for themselves a holiday or to
recommend that they should be dissolved for the purpose of holding •
election the position would be easier. I much feared however that
once the Majlis was re-opened there would be slashing attacks on
Qawam and possibly a vote of no confidence. In that event the
Shah would find himself compelled to choose between the retention
of Qawam or the dissolution of the.Majlis, If he adopted the
latter alternative he would have to make it clear that the disso
lution was only preliminary to new-election, the date of which
might have to be advanced. This would give him and the G-ovemment
useful respite, but of course there was no guarantee that the new'
deputies would be any improvement on their predecessors. The Shah
said he would reflect on the issues involved and discuss it again.
The Shah again complained of our arrest of Zahidi saying that
if he had been consulted he. would have arranged everything. v I *
replied that Zalridi was a clever and dangerous intriguer and that
with the examples of Vaziri, whose arrest we had patiently awaited
for 6 months, and of four outstanding suspects of whom one at least
was in the army, we felt it unfair to impose a task on the Persian
authorities which they might he incapable of fulfilling. The Shah
admitted that the police were a poor body. I then told the Shah that
he must have no illusions about the infallibility of his army. How
could he expect junior officers whose nay was less than that of his
cook to be honest and free from political intrigue. He agreed and
hoped to arrange for increases in pay. I suggested that to keep
down the expenditure involved he might at the same time comb out..
some of the worst offenders. I warned him too not to trust too
implicitly senior officers who, once they found themselves in a
position of power, might well put their personal ambitions before
Ihe throne. The Shall seemed lo appreciate this aspect.
I asked the Shah why he did not broadcast some declaration to
the effect that he had his people’s welfare at heart, was opposed to
any repetition of recent disorders and that the present Government
had his full confidence in the work of reconstruction. Such a'
declaration, coupled possibly with reference to Persian solidarity
with the Allies, might have calming effect as showing united front
against intrigue and subversive activities. He promised to think
'over the idea.
In conclusion I suggested that when the political situation
cleared he might like to inspect recently arrived battalion of
British troops. The idea seemed to appeal to him.
[Copies sent to Mr, Armstrong].