Coll 28/44 ‘Persia. Internal. Fars affairs & Shiraz situation’ [‎10r] (19/843)

and partly to the tribal nature which prizes power and independence. Taking
advantage of the weakness of the Government after the events of 1941, certain
tribal leaders fled from Tehran and resumed control of the tribes. Gradually the
tribes were rearmed by seizing arms from Government sources, by smuggling
from abroad, and by digging up weapons not surrendered in the past.
Having, through his strong personality and in virtue of the fact that he is the
*^son of the last great Ilkhani The paramount chief of certain tribes in south west Iran. , consolidated his own position as head of the tribe,
Nasir Khan’s next step was the conclusion of a defensive alliance between the
Qashgai and the Boir Ahmedi—the two leading fighting tribes of South Persia—
to resist disarmament by force. .
There seems little doubt but that these two tribes would now act in concert it
attacked by the Government, and that other tribes, such as the Mamassani and
sections of the Khamseh (notably the Basiri), would refuse to aid the disarming
Government forces, and might even take sides against Government.
On the Government side, the army has not yet given proof of its abilit\ to
tackle these tribes, and judging by past performance the disarmament of the
present tribal bloc would be a severe and perhaps critical test of its fighting
powers. t
Thus, as between tribes and Government there is a deadlock. The Govern
ment hesitate to embark on a disarmament campaign, while the tribes have done
nothing to provoke Government into action.
2. A ttitude towards British.
Owing particularlv to the attitude of the khans of the Darrashuri and
Kashguli sections of the Qashgai, the Germans who were harboured by the Qashgai
were not able to bring about damage to British interests. On the contrary, when
they were in tribal—though admittedly not Qashgai—areas, Nasir initiated his
policy of preserving security in Ears. For the last six months, including this
spring migration, security in Qashgai areas and on adjoining roads has been
relatively good. This state of affairs was not altered (although the wound still
smarts), when a severe blow was given to Nasir’s pride by the Persian Government
who refused to allow him to become a Deputy for Shiraz. Nor is there any reason,
on present showing, to think that British interests are likely to suffer at the hands
of the Fars tribes, i.e., not including the Boir Ahmed. Furthermore, Nasir s
feelings towards us will undoubtedly have a useful repercussion on the Boir
Ahmed, as the paramount chief of that tribe—Abdullah Khan Zarghampur—is
a close friend of Nasir’s.
This agreeable state of affairs is not due to Nasir’s love and admiration for
us, but more probably to the following considerations : (a) knowledge of Allied
war successes and desire to be on the ‘ ‘ right side; (b) general desire of the
khans (especially Darrashuri and Kashguli) to be on friendly terms with us so
that we may act as mediators between them and the Persian Government;
(c) gratitude for our return of the Qashgai Khans who were recently in Germany.
This argument especially appeals to Nasir’s mother, who exercises a salutary
influence over him; and^ finally (d) desire of the Khans to further their own
personal interests.
Nasir Khan and the.other Qashgai Khans now stress their desire to follow our
counsels. Of course, this naive attitude must be heavily discounted, but it is
probably true that, for the time being, our advice will carry considerable weight
with them.
3. Internal Situation.
There is, as yet, very little evidence of the attitude of the other Qashgai
Khans towards Nasir save that, at the moment, they are united with him in
opposing disarmament. In any case, the present state of affairs rather suits the
personaf interest of all the khans. They supervise security on the roads, exacting
tribute money in return. They are independent, and pay no taxes. No Govern
ment official robs or worries them. In fact, they are leading the old tribal life.
But some of them yearn to come and live in towns. Even Nasir and some of his
family desire this. Some khans may resent Nasir’s assumption of authority over
them. Former inter-tribal feuds are not forgotten. Furthermore, some of the
khans desire to return to their former pursuits of agriculture and stock-breeding,
from which they derived wealth in the past. The situation may be roughly
summarised by stating that the Qashgai in times of war or danger are united
under Nasir, but that, being human, they desire peace, and peaceful conditions
best serve to disintegrate the tribe.
[55—15] B 2