Coll 6/65 'Relations between Saudi-Arabia and the Yemen.' [‎112v] (224/917)

9
The story of the two missions which Ibn Saud sent to Sana in 1927 and the
Yemeni missions which came to Mecca in 1928 becomes much clearer than it has
hitherto been. The telegrams between the Imam and Ibn Saud which produced
the latter's award giving Arwa to the Imam are still of interest. The most
important points are perhaps the following :—
(a) When the first Saudi mission went to Sana they were confronted with
a Yemeni claim to the whole of Asir, as having always been Yemeni, despite
Idrisi occupation. The Saudi mission counterclaimed the whole country as far
as Mokha and Zebid and inland to Bajil, as having been Idrisi, and denied all
lemeni claims in Asir. It is not astonishing that no agreement was reached.
(b) Chapter III contains proces-verbauoc of meetings held during the visit of
the second Saudi mission to Sana. If trustworthy, they bear out the recent Saudi
contention that an oral agreement of sorts was reached in the course of two
meetings, as stated in Mr. Zada's letter to Mr. Rendel of the 28th July, 1933.
It is less important to try to ascertain the effect of that agreement, none of the
versions of which quite agree in terms, than to record the fact that it was clearly
a status quo arrangement only. The best of several proofs of this is that, when
sending his own mission immediately afterwards to Mecca, the Imam wrote a
letter to Ibn Saud in which he described his object as being to convince the King
of his claim to “ what is in the hands of the Idrisi .... together with all that is
counted as of Khaulan-bin-Amr and Hamdan-bin-Zeyd.” This, I think, can
be taken as a restatement of his demands of the previous year, though it is difficult
to estimate the territorial scope of demands in regard to the interior, defined
with reference to the names of tribal ancestors.
{c) The Imam’s mission to Mecca accomplished absolutely nothing and though
the status quo went on it might well be argued that whatever validity it had was
impaired or destroyed by the failure of the negotiations in the course of which
it was more or less defined. The Imam does not, however, seem to have taken this
line. He bided his time until he advanced to Arwa.
(d) The Arwa incident led to a fresh meeting of delegations. As you are
aware, they came to a deadlock over territorial questions and the Imam left the
matter to the arbitration of Ibn Saud. The King’s telegram of the 22nd Rajab,
1350 (the 3rd December, 1931), giving his award, is precise only in the phrase :
“ I say that I abandon Jebel Arwa to your Honour.’’ It is. however, clear from
the correspondence that other specific areas had been discussed, including that
of the Beni Malik and Jebel Fifa. and the Imam, in his reply of the 27th Rajab,
1350 (the 8 th December, 1931), said that he had instructed his delegates not to
pursue the question of that particular area. This goes far to justify Ibn Saud’s
resentment at the Imam's recent interference in the area in question, but the
correspondence is in other respects ambiguous. The editor of the Green Book
seems hardly justified in stating that the Imam’s telegram constitutes a complete
recognition of the frontier by the Imam, subject only to a request of consideration
of a proposal of his in regard to two named tribes. From a European point of
view the upshot of the Arwa dispute can only be regarded as obscure, except as
regards Arwa itself and perhaps the Beni Malik-Fifa area.
(e) Immediately after the settlement of the Arwa question, the delegates
signed a Treaty of Friendship. &c., dated the 15th December, 1931. It was noted
at the time that this treaty made no reference to frontiers. It has always been
doubtful whether the Imam regarded it as a treaty at all, although the Saudi
Government stated later that it had been ratified by an exchange of telegrams.
It now appears from the texts of these as published’ in the Green Book that Ibn
Saud's telegram expressed a straightforward approval of what his delegates had
agreed to, but the Imam's telegram could be read either as an approval or as a
postponement pending further discussion. On the face of it, it looks like an
approval but he asked the King to send his delegates again to discuss outstanding
minor points.
6 . ( hapters \ I to XIII relate to the most recent phase beginning about the
end of August 1932, when, after delay due to various causes, including the Ibn
Rifada revolt, the King again turned his attention seriously to his relations
with the Imam. I have not had the whole of these chapters translated, as you
are familiar with the main course of events and the result of all the negotiations
including the King's suggestion for a sort of alliance, has been negative so far
as any agreements of permanent effect are concerned.