File 3579/1916 'Turkey: the future of Constantinople' [‎35v] (79/530)

On the other hand it was urged that the disappearance of the Turk wnue
removing an admitted ill, will introduce a number o new ~ fiken
complications in its place ; that if his claws be clipped, an a power , , i ,
away, he will become an innocuous if not a positive respectaole creature that,
once his friendly relations with ourselves are resumed, he may even provide
benevolent buffer between the ambitions of Europe and our own E ^ e ™^
that his expulsion would be a grave outrage to Mohammedan sentiment t g
the world, and more particularly in India, where the success,ve blows “^er which the
Sultan and his dominions have reeled m recent years are said to have^ created an
unfavourable impression; and where this final sentence would be regarded as
affront to Islam, prepared or connived m by Great Britain, the second greatest
Mohammedan power in the world. . . . , u k
In reply, however, to these forebodings, it was pointed out by many who have
direct knowledge of India that the Indian Mohammedans have never attached anv
particular sanctity or reverence to Constantinople ; that they have grown accustomed
to the gradual diminution of the Ottoman power m Europe and A fr ica ’ that th J
borne without excitement his expulsion from the Holy Places m the present war,
that they have even fought against the Turkish armies m more than one campaign ;
and that they evinced neither astonishment nor regret when the intentions ol the
Allies with regard to Constantinople were announced to the world. So far indeed froin
beino- surprised by their fulfilment, they would be more likely to regard it as a mar - o
Allied weakness or of the Sultan’s diplomatic triumph if they were now abandoned. In
this contest it was remarked that the present attitude of the Turk a 0118 an mo P e >
and his evasions and pretexts in respect of carrying out the armistice, are an eloquent
confirmation of the position which he may be expected to assume should his adversaries
be so weak or so foolish as to spare him. ^,11 • 1 , • r
The question of the removal of the Turk was to some affected by considerations of
the identity of his successor ; inasmuch as some, who were m favour of expulsion on t e
merits, were disposed to qualify their views, unless satisfied as to the substitute by
whom he would be replaced.
IT
This brings me to the second question—viz., whether, in the event of the disappear
ance of the Turk, any foreign Power could profitably or safely be put m his place
President Wilson is believed to favour the selection of some neutral State, there is
no such State possessing either the prestige, the influence, or the resources that would
iustify it for the task ; and the placing of Constantinople m the hands of a weak i ower
would be not an avoidance but an encouragement of future trouble. Moreover, the
selection of any such State would result in the embittered jealousy of those minor
Powers who have for long aspired to the inheritance. Of these, Bulgaria was thought
at one time, in the early stages of the first Balkan war, to have a good chance, but she
forfeited it by her errors in the second Balkan campaign, and by her conduct in the
recent war. Her selection would now be' impossible, and would arouse the undying
animosity of Boumania and Greece. ... t •
The latter Power could only be chosen at the cost of similar heart burnmgs.^ ^ She
has no claim for so immense an increase of authority, which her slender military
and naval resources would render her powerless to maintain, and the smaller but stil
considerable extension of territory which she is likely to receive as the result of the
war should more than satisfy both her ambitions and her deserts.
Of the Great Powmrs France is already, as reported in the daily telegrams,
endeavouring by every manner of means to establish a position of predominance 111
Constantinople, and, in the imperialistic spirit by which she appears to be animated,^
would doubtless clutch at a prize which would crown her position as the mistress of
the Near East. These pretensions could not possibly be acquiesced in by Great
Britain, and would meet with the relentless opposition of Italy.
For similar reasons Italy would not be tolerated either by France or by ourselves.
Great Britain, because of her traditional policy and her great Eastern connections,
would in some respects be the most suitable heir to the Turk, and the choice would
probably be more acceptable than any other to the Eastern world. But the main
duties and responsibilities of Britain lie elsewhere ; she will emerge from the war with
an increase of obligations which she will with difficulty sustain ; and no British Govern
ment would dream of adding to them by the assumption of so vast and perilous a charge.
There remains America. This solution has been urged by many, who are not
merely anxious that the United States should take their share in bearing the burden of the