'File 53/1915 Pt 2 German War: Turkey; the Caliphate and Pan-Arab movement' [‎82r] (168/444)

Military Secret,
134
i
From Viceroy, 30th November 1915.
Reference your telegram of 25th instant, No. 3160. Independent
examination prior to receipt of Nixon’s 1008/64/0, 26th November, leads us
i? a f r 7 ee 1 generally with estimate of Turkish strength at Ctesiphon and
In Ann U ^ *, ts rate ^ rowt ^’ exc ept that we prefer to work on the figures
60 000 by end of January, as estimated-by combined War Office and
Admiralty staffs in their Memorandum of 19th October Nixon is correct
c i ru ^ng factor in rapidity of our concentration is the supply
o additional river tiansport, in wlncli respect yon liave received repeated
requests from us to hasten rate of supplies, and we are searching India for
suitable vessels. In the meantime Nixon must do the best he can with
what he has got, winch on a rise of the river and by marching troops
from Amara should enable him to get the Lahore and Meerut Divi
sions to Kut-el-Amara early in February. As regards his force, Nixon
is in eiror in counting upon 34th and 35th Brigades which, aide our telegram
of 25th instant, H. 9386, are to be withdrawn when replaced by Lahore and
Meerut Divisions as their presence in India is necessary. It follows that
Nixon’s force may have to be increased from elsewhere, and in our opinion
a safe estimate for the capture and retention of Baghdad under altered
conditions involves addition of at least one more division which with the
Lahore and Meerut divisions and drafts will make Nixon’s force to five
divisions in all.
This estimate of five divisions which we consider a safe one is, however,
based on the following facts (1) That since 19th October, when the joint
Admiralty and War Office Staff drew up their memorandum nothing has
occurred or is likely to occur in the near East to prevent Turks sending the
full amount of reinforcement then considered possible ; (2) That Russia
remains inactive in the Caucasus and north-west Persia.
If on the other hand it should be thought that any important modifica
tions in above factors have taken place or are likely to do so we consider
Nixon will be able to capture and hold Baghdad with four divisions and that
it will not be necessary to draw an additional division from the main theatre
unless it were freely available owing to the general strategic plan of
operations.
To regard capture of Baghdad as impossible would be to give up our
best means of countering the German intrigues in Persia and Von Der Goltz’s
plans for organising Persia and Afghanistan against India and should
therefore be dismissed from our calculations. Our success hitherto in
Mesopotamia has been main factor which has kept Persia, Afghanistan, and
India itself quiet, and to give up the idea of Baghdad would be to relinquish
initiative and would result in a further transference eastward of the theatre
of war. For these reasons we approve Nixon’s attitude in not discussing
the alternative of adopting a defensive attitude as a permanency though he
must necessarily remain chiefly on the defensive until his reinforcements can
reach the front.