File 3372/1916 Pt 2 'Arabia: French and Italian policy' [‎35r] (78/498)

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EASTERN COMMITTEE,
Hie I uture of Mesopotamia.
/v c [E.C. 173.]
(aotk ry Sir Percy Cox.)
I.
1. Before dealing with lesser Psues 1 shouJd like to state the position -is 1
understand ,t to be at present, to make sure that I start from the r,>ht premise".
fi - In the proclamation which we issued on our arrival at Baghdad we announced
and'"not “as C *'cr" r' " e t0 tbe "' ol ; 111 at lar * e . ihat we came as friends
and not as conquerors, to emancipate the inhabitants of the country from
the oppressive rule of the Turks, and to assist then, to work out their
destiny on more auspicious lines. Incidentally we invited them to come
lorwaid and take part in the administration
(ii) In the announcement of policy made by His Majesty’s Government in the
teleginm of-.)th March I!Hi, from the Secretary of State for India to the
Viceioy, it was stated that, whereas it was contemplated that the Basrah
\ilayet (as then defined) should “remain permanently under British
administration and annexation was definitely indicated, the Bao-hdad
\ dayet on the other hand, was to he formed into an Arab State or Province
under British protection, in everything hut name.
_. Du l ing the year that has since elapsed the general situation lias undergone
considerable development, an important feature of which has been the entry of
Amei ica into the war, and in the latter connection certain fundamental principles
have been enunciated for which America in particular and the other Allies in general
aie tonsideied to be fighting. Of these principles the one which particularly
com ei ns us at the moment requires that the peoples of the countries interested or
alle< ted should be allowed to determine their own form of Government. Recently
the Prime Minister has publicly stated that the, destinies of Palestine, Mesopotamia,
&c., will be decided at the Peace Conference.
d. I gather that it is now proposed to deliberate as to what particular steps or
line ol action are advisable in order to square our working policy with the above
principle and announcements, in case we should have to adhere to them in spite of
the fact that Germany has not respected them in dealing with conquered territory
in Russia.
I. 1 assume that, if at the end of the war we find ourselves in a sufficiently strong-
position, and in effective administrative control, we should still hope to annex the
Basrah Vilayet and exercise a veiled protectorate over the Baghdad Vilayet; hut it
is recognised that the question of annexation lias become exceedingly difficult vis-a-vis
the P resident of the United’ States, who will presumably exercise the most potent
influence at the Peace Conference. Our original proposals must consequently he
regarded as a counsel of perfection, and we must he prepared to accept something
less. At any rate, however, we have the strongest grounds, in view of our assurances
to the inhabitants and the millions of money we have sunk in making the Port, for
standing out for the annexatio n of Bas rah a nd from thence to the s ea, with a small
block of territory necessaTy'lo round oil the enclaveT As regards the rest of the
\occupied territories, the essential aim must he to effect the complete elimination of
Turkish suzerainty, and it is assumed that we shall leave no stone unturned to achieve
that end, only tolerating its retention in the last resort.
5. In any case we must set our faces against the admission of the slightest
T urkisli element or participation in the administration. In this connection, I should
mention that when 1 was in Cairo it was suggested that, as events were shaping, we
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