File 3372/1916 Pt 2 'Arabia: French and Italian policy' [‎240r] (488/498)

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lieni \erj much to the fore in Arabia and holding their own. He cites
Halioj, [vunhda and the lailure there; the slow progress of the Sherif of
Mecca, and iinally Mesopotamia, and he doubts our ability to dislodge them
His fears to-day are two-fold. He believes that—
0) his refusal to treat with any other Power, and his promise uot to
dispose of harasau Islands and rights therein, will draw upon
him 1 urkish animosity. 'I he Turks up to now have watched
his coquetry with us but believe they can win him back to the
fold hereafter. Let them once come to know of his closer
“nexus " with us as regards the Islands and they will regard
him as completely ostracised. Ihere is no arguing with a
fanatic of such preconceived notions ;
(-) this engagement will deprive him of future assistance in arms and
ammunition from Djibouti and Massowa, both of which places
ha\e lot main yenis very considerably assisted in the arms
traffic.
Cut off from these two sources of supply to whom, he asks, should he apply
for the necessary sinews of war, and whom should he approach hereafter
except the British Government ? The Government must therefore take the
place of these two Powers.
The sole Power the Jdrisi fears now, and after the war, is Turkey aided
by Germany, and the reason given for securing not only our promise of
assistance in arms, but of advice in the development of his country, an
asylum —should a crisis in the country compel his temporary withdrawal—
coupled with the assurance of a continuation of these terms after the war to
himself and successors —is this one inordinate fear of a prospectively
irate Turkey. From this obsession he could not be dissuaded. At first it
was our flag that would incense the Turks, and on the second visit it would
be the engagement to refrain from a cession of the Islands that was bound
to arouse Turkish resentment.
At one time in the proceedings the Idrisi had insisted on the despatch of
British troops inland, if he were attacked by the Turks, but I reminded him
that cur earlier treaty was confined to his sea-board and to protection by
sea power.
1 may say that although this engagement in its inception was peculiar to
the Farasan lslands, yet the Idrisi was loud in predicting for the whole of
his territories the ill-forebodings he had conjured up as the likely result of
his agreeing to paragraph HI. It was therefore not possible—given the
desideratum of securing his adhesion to this paragraph—to exclude from
the agreement this extended area of his entire sea-board. His Minister
(Bu Sabi) declared (and we cannot refute it) that the Farasan Islands were
the Idrisi’s before the 30th April 1915, 1
Dateo hist tieau an( ] that, though not specifically men
tioned, the Farasan became at once a part and parcel of his sea-board and
within the purview of that treaty.
One result of the present agreement, will be the exclusion ot Italian
inlluence in the Idrisi’s domains. His Minister told me that the Italians
were very desirous of concluding some agreement with the Idrisi to secure a
(iuid pro quo of their long established connection qua the arms trade, and
tint even now the Italians sent him ammunition. At the same time the
Idrisi scouted the idea of dealing with any Power save Great Britain, and to
our Government he looked for every form of assistance.
\s regards j aragraph V. I found it impolitic to insist on an\ fixed
uber of his retainers on the Island. I had insisted on a number not
less than one hundred men,” Imt this was met by the argument that many
more might lie required and the exact number had best be left to time and
om-mrsnuice. The Minister who was deputed on board said that the
Kansan ‘islanders were a very stout body of men who would give a
account of .hen, selves if necessary. I waived the point of ,.umbers for I was
Teaiing With a peculiar east of man, and was guided also by the principle
that especially with Asiatics, is
enforce nor supervise without causing friction,
engaged to ensure his il effective occupation.
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