File 756/1917 Pt 2-3 ‘ARAB BULLETIN Nos 66-114’ [‎201r] (410/834)

SOUTHERN ARAB ARMIES IN MAY.
Major Davenport, M.C., has sent in a report to supplement
his diaries during May. The following extracts throw strong
light on the causes of the comparative failure of the Southern
Armies. In regard to the first attempt on the Mellal bridges
Major Davenport writes: —
“On May 11 S her if Abdullah moved his whole force up
to the attack at noon.
“ I he Bedouins all moved off and got to their positions
quickly ; but the Baghdadi officers at once began delaying the
guns and were nearly an hour late in getting into position. The
two E. A. mountain guns were sent one to each flank, one on
Jebel el-Gharaba and the other at tne Kashm el-Gazeil. The two
lurkish field-guns were placed at Jebel el-Ivhejdla opposite the
bridge defences. 1 moved the French and British demolition
parties up to Jebel el-Kheyila. When I got there 1 found the
Baghdadi officers in a great state of fear, although as yet the
Turks had not fired a shot : they had placed the gun behind a
high hill which they could not possibly clear. Sherif Abdullah
ibn Thawaband a lot of Bedouins came up to me and remonstrated
about the way the Baghdadis were behaving in not bringing the
guns into action, when they were waiting to advance. The Sherif
told me the officers had said the Turks must not see them and
they must not see the Turks, and had refused to move the guns.
He asked me to order them out. I said I was afraid I could not
give an order to the Sherif’s troops, but I would go and see what
I could do. I found the officers all in a state of panic and they
gave many excuses for not coming away from the mountain. I
then told them what I thought of them, left them, rode back to-
the Sherif and told him I could do nothing with them, and that
it was up to him to force them into action. I said I would
support him with Sherif Abdullah, if the officers caused
trouble.
“Ibn Thawab then went clown with a lot of Bedu and
forced the guns to come into a fire position. The Bedu had
drawn their knives and were making suggestive gestures across
their throats, implying that that was how they intended to treat
the Baghdadis if they did not come into action. Eventually
they began firing, and the Bedu under Sherif Abdullah ibn
Thawab were already running across the open to the Turkish
positions. The fire of the field-guns was disgusting, but the two
mountain guns did excellent practice on the Turkish works.
“ Just at dusk the guns were all withdrawn and the Bedu
were closely engaged with all the Turkish posts. I sent the four
E.A. machine guns up under Captain Clayton, M.C., in the
evening, to assist the Bedu, but they did not succeed in getting
into action. About an hour after dark the Bedu had taken three
strong Turkish posts.