File 756/1917 Pt 2-3 ‘ARAB BULLETIN Nos 66-114’ [‎233r] (474/834)

help to explain the actual situation : likewise, any data of
geographical or other scientific interest, which may be brought to
light by our penetration of the Arab countries during the present
war. It is part of the Editor’s purpose that a complete file of
the Bulletin since its beginning should be indispensable to anyone
who hereafter may have to compile, for official use, a history of
Arabs during the last three years, an Intelligence Handbook of
any Arab district, or even a map of Arabia. As full an index
as possible has been issued at the end .of each year, on the
presumption that Departments and officials receiving the
Bulletin, keep complete files, and have these bound for future
reference. We have some reason to know that this presumption
is not altogether justified.
Needless to say, this threefold aim has neither been kept
always in view nor fully realised. Nor has it been possible to
act up to any respectable standard of Arab scholarship—the
variant orthography, which each Index reveals, would refute any
such claim ! But the fact that the Bulletin has been suffered to
reach its hundredth number and approach a thousand and a half
pages, may be taken as consolatory evidence that it fills a felt
want in the present war.
D.G.H.
CENTRAL ARABIAN POLITICS.
Mr. Philby has furnished in'telegrams, the last being dated
July 24, the following information about the political situation
in liiadh since April last:—
It appears that when he rejoined Ibn Sand in April, he
found him greatly disappointed with the outcome of his
negotiations and firmly convinced that he had only the Sherif
to^thank. Mr. Philby"pressed him to maintain effective control
of Qasim, and exercise pressure on the Shammar to stop smuggling ;
at the same time urging him to undertake an attack against Hail,
and promising him a favourable settlement of the Ajman question.
The Emir was assured that our engagements with the_ Sherif
involved nothing that could prejudice his interests, or militate in
any way against his absolute independence. In response to
Ibn Sand’s plea of lack of funds, Mr. Philby advanced him
certain monies lying at Uqair on condition that he attacked the
Shammar. Ibn Saud accepted the money, and agreed to open
an offensive at the beginning of Ramadan, and preparations were
made accordingly ; but a series of untoward events such as the
Koweit blockade, the attack on Khurrna and tribal difficulties
arising out of the conflicting interests of himself, Mesopotamia
and Koweit, caused him to stay his hand, and it was soon
evident that he was suspicious of our policy and inclined to
listen to public opinion, which openly demanded action against