File 756/1917 Pt 2-3 ‘ARAB BULLETIN Nos 66-114’ [‎308r] (624/834)

the Bagdadi officers, but they, of their own accord, ordered
luikish officers to do it. The latter state that their task was a
matter of great difficulty ; often, for example, at the moment of
departure, when they had made up the hamlas, the Bedu would
refuse to start unless the numbers were reduced on the ground
that this camel was overloaded, that one ill, and so on These
changes were effected without reference to the Turkish officers
responsible, so that the latter were unable to correct their totals
and in consequence returns in some cases were probably duplicated!
Further, the Bagdadi officer in charge of the concentration camp
at (xena, Muheddin _ Effendi, never checked the numbers on
arrival, merely accepting the Turkish lists as they came in with
each hamla.
The disparity is, however, comparatively slight and round
figures can be given with reasonable safety.
According to Ali Negib Bey, the whole Hejaz Expeditionary
force, occupying positions from Tebuk to Medina, totalled in
November some 550 officers, and rather less than 11,000 men
with 53 officials. Of these, 491 officers, 7,545 men and all the
civilians have been evacuated to Egypt. The remainder have been
accounted for as follows : Spanish influenza and other illnessses
exacted a heavy toll, over 850 dying of the former in December
alone and nearly 200 more in January prior to the evacuation
Another 100 succumbed while en route for the coast, while 300
have remained in hospital in Medina. Of the rest, some 430 i.e.
an Arab railway battalion, numbering over 300, and the personnel
of the water company, about 130, were left behind in Medina by
arrangement. Over 1,000, again, of whom more than three-
quarters were Syrians and Bagdadis, voluntarily elected to remain
ni Medina oi the vicinity, and work in with the new regime
Finally, some-50 Ageyl, being by heredity guides and earners
of no particular allegiance, went their various ways.
Treatment of Turks by Arabs.
At the moment of the occupation of Medina the problem of
the safe transport of the Turks to the coast presented certain
features which afforded good ground for anxiety.
The chief was the attitude of the Harb and, to a lesser degree
the Juheina. The former, notoriously among the most savage
ol the Bedu, m part commanded the routes ; and were in a
restless state owing to the fact that they were for the most part
nine months in arrears of pay. It was feared that they might
paralyse the evacuation scheme by withholding camels inter
cepting supplies or even actively obstructing the unarmed
Turkish columns en route. At the start, indeed, Ali could
collect only 400 camels in six days at Yenbo, while, to make
matters worse, the Harb had just previously intercepted a supply
column on its way to him at Bir Derwish, so that he was without
fresh supplies for several weeks. The first batch of prisoners