File 756/1917 Pt 2-3 ‘ARAB BULLETIN Nos 66-114’ [‎320r] (648/834)

I *$>
i
1/
prove either the most formidable of enemies or the most efficient
of protectors.
The Idrisi’s attitude towards the Ebhah question after the
Armistice was ostensibly one of detachment, anxious and expectant,
but deliberate and complete. There are at any rate some good
reasons for supposing that his ostensible attitude was also^ his
real one. He said he had received one bad snub over Kunfidah
and did not want another over Ebhah. He realised that if he
laid himself open to a charge of intrigue in that quarter, Iving
Husein, with British support, might be in a position to inflict
another public humiliation on him. The avoidance of such
humiliations is a master motive in the Idrisi s mind, because he
not only has a very good opinion of himself, but is conscious that
he must make up in personal what he lacks in hereditary
dignity. ‘ _
The case, however, would be entirely altered il Ibn Aidh
should offer a voluntary submission. \\ hen Muhieddin Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders.
so acted as to smooth things over between the Idrisi and Ibn
Aidh, as he undoubtedly did, he put himself in the good books
of both, and secured an unmolested passage to the coast. i he
added difficulties of evacuation resulting from shortage of money
made Muhieddin Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. lean all the more heavily on the Idrisi.
The net result was that at any rate during the time of the eva
cuation the Idrisi exercised some sort of real overlordship at and
near Ebhah. Ibn Aidh and other former pro-Turks addressed him
in conciliatory and submissive language, and Ids representatives
passed freely to and from Ebhah supervising and negotiating.
There is no obvious reason why Ibn Aidh should feel less de
pendent on the Idrisi now that the departure of the Turks is a
fact, than he at once felt when it became a probabdity, and in
the light of events the joint approaches made by Muhieddin
Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. and Ibn Aidh to King Husein appear to have been merely
an effort to ensure that there should be a back door open, if the
front door through the Idrisi’s territories should prove to be shut.
One of the great difficulties of the evacuation was the disposal
of the war material stored at Ebhah. The natives could withstand
parting with the Turks, but no Arab could bear with equanimity
to see°guns, shells, and rifles carried quietly away out of reach.
Ibn Aidh, by promising more than sufficient camels and then at
the last moment supplying only a very inadequate number, did
his best to ensure that as large as possible a proportion of these
munitions should remain at Ebhah. Muhieddin Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , however,
by bringing down the complete tale of mountain guns and
machine guns, while leaving behind more ammunition for
both than°had been agreed upon, seems to have done what he
could to fulfil his obligations in the spirit, if he could not fulfil
them in the letter.
The Turks as they arrived on the coast appeared a him,
sturdy, well disciplined, and soldierly-looking lot of men, in
spite of their uniforms cut out of worn-out tents and their