'HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. VOLUME I.' [‎41r] (86/454)

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ARMY'IN INDIA: PRE-WAR MILITARY POLICY 61
nearly four hundred guns—about one hundred being of
European manufacture—and the arms factory An East India Company trading post. at Kabul was
turning out an unknown* number of guns, modern rifles and
ammunition, the strength of the Afghan army was estimated
at about 60,000 regulars, backed by a number of irregulars
varying, according to the locality, to a maximum of about
100,000 at any one time. The whole situation was full of
uncertainties and consequently gave rise to considerable
anxiety.
Within the area in our sphere of control the Amir kept up
regular pro-Afghan agencies—for some years Nasrulla had
control of these and subsidised many of the principal men
among our tribes; although, with two or three exceptions,
the tribal militias fulfilled their purpose, there were at times
signs that our system of non-intervention and of allowances
paid to the tribes for their pacific co-operation did not really
. afford adequate control; so that the general view among our
frontier officials was that in the event of hostilities with
Afghanistan we should have most of our own frontier tribes
also against us.
Inter-communication among the tribes themselves had also
improved, and in consequence there was always the possibility
that, were their susceptibilities to become affected by any
considerable religious movement, we might have to face a large
and partially organised rising along the whole frontier. Many
of the tribesmen had received a full military training in the
ranks of our regular or irregular units and were well acquainted
with our principles and methods of warfare ; this knowledge,
added to their own natural aptitude for fighting and with their
martial qualities kept alert by constant tribal fights and blood
feuds, constituted them rather formidable opponents. Their
fighting strength was estimated at about 350,000, of whom
about a quarter possessed modern rifles. In considering the
potential dangers of the situation, the inaccessibility and remote
ness from main railways and roads of these frontier areas must
be borne in mind ; for these facts and the warlike capacity of
the tribesmen had in the past compelled us to employ forces
disproportionate to the armed strength and military resources
of the territories we had to deal with ; moreover, we had, except
in a few minor instances, never inflicted such a crushing defeat
on them as to leave the memory of it long in their minds ;
and it is a necessity, arising from the nature of our rule and
* This was owing to the strict secrecy maintained by the Amir and to our
deliberate policy of non-intervention and abstention from espionage.