'HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. VOLUME I.' [‎115v] (235/454)

208 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
captured a hundred and fifty prisoners. In the meantime
the 24th Punjabis on the right, experiencing little opposition!
had come upon the abandoned guns and captured them and
their gun detachments who were sheltering close by. The
cavalry brigade charged a number of the retreating enemy,
inflicting considerable loss and capturing a number of exhausted
stragglers.
By 2.30 p.m., General Delamain had cleared the western
vicinity of the Shaiba position of the enemy; but there were
still considerable numbers of them in the direction of South
mound, then some three miles distant. Turks and Arabs
appeared to be concentrating there, and their guns were still
firing intermittently on Shaiba. General Delamain proposed
to General Melliss that he should advance on South mound,
though his troops were somewhat exhausted and the infantry
had used up most of the ammunition they had with them.
The men had been under arms continuously since the previous
afternoon and a fresh attack on South mound might involve
them in fighting after dark. General Melliss decided, there
fore, that it was inadvisable to carry out the project and
at 3 p.m. he issued orders for the troops to withdraw to camp.
This they did without further fighting and the ensuing night
was quiet and undisturbed.*
The enemy’s casualties were estimated at a thousand,
and over four hundred prisoners, two mountain guns and a
standard had fallen into British hands. During the day, the
total British casualties only amounted to one hundred and
thirty-two, including those incurred in the first unsuccessful
attack by the cavalry brigade on North mound. Forty-eight
of these casualties had occurred in the 104th Rifles, whose
behaviour was specially commended by General Delamain.!
He also mentions the fine spirit of the 24th Punjabis, who—
having arrived at Shaiba by helium during the night—had
been without food for twenty-four hours when they started
upon the operations of the 13th. At 6.15 p.m. on the 13th,
General Melliss estimated the enemy opposite him at ten
* Though Sulaiman Askari was in chief command of the Turkish force,
Ali Bey was in virtual executive command throughout the fighting at Shaiba.
Information derived from Turkish sources indicates that Ali Bey intended,
if the night attack of the 12th-l 3th proved unsuccessful,to retire to the Barjisiya
wood before daylight, entrench there and await a British counter-attack,
thus forcing the enemy to come out into the open. The night attack was
unsuccessful, but Sulaiman Askari insisted upon renewing the attack next
morning.
t In his report. General Delamain refers to “ the remarkably good work
done by the 104th Rifles on every occasion it has been engaged.”