'HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA 1914-1918. VOLUME I.' [‎130v] (265/454)

236 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
left Nasiriya for Kut al Amara and were thought to have gone
thence to Baghdad to reorganise, and to have no intention of
joining in any anticipated fighting near Amara; about three
battalions had remained at Nasiriya, where Ajaimi with a
force of Arabs and some guns was believed to be in no condition
to initiate an offensive movement; Arabistan had been cleared
of the Turks by General Gorringe who was also dealing
effectively with the hostile Arabs there ; and at Ruta on the
Tigris, the 1 urks had about four battalions and six guns with a
party of Germans assisting them by the construction and
lodgment of floating mines. General Nixon stated that the
lack of shallow-draught steamers* necessitated postponement
for the time being of any advance towards Nasiriya, but he was
arranging to attack the Turkish positions near Ruta, so that the
6th Division might be able, with the help of the Royal Navy,
to advance to Amara. He was withdrawing from Ahwaz to
Basra all the troops that the small amount of dry ground at
Basra enabled him to encamp there.
Thereupon, General Nixon was asked by India for an assur
ance that he would not require reinforcements for the con
templated advance to Amara, as the Secretary of State would
probably ask for this before sanctioning the operation. General
Nixon replied on the 21st giving the necessary assurance;
and on the 23rd May the Viceroy sent the following telegram
to Lord Crewe :—
Your telegram of 24th ultimo . . . Nixon proposes to
take offensive from Ourna up Tigris on 24th and does not
consider any reinforcement will be required. We consider
this move desirable in order to extend our control over
Tigris valley, thereby' securing the pipe-line and protecting
the Basra vilayet in accordance with his orders, and do
not propose to interfere with his intention. He will not
of course proceed beyond Amara without your sanction.”
As mentioned above, Lord Crewe, while admitting that the
possession of Amara might secure Ahwaz from raids, was not
in favour of the operation, as he considered that there was a
risk in holding so advanced a post during the summer months
and before there were available! sufficient light-draught gun-
* Hve of the steamers and four launches of those asked for from India had
arrived by this time and two more steamers and four tugs arrived two days
later. But they all required much overhauling after their oversea voyage
before they were fit to use.
t The two river gunboats sent by the Admiralty from Egypt had sunk in
their passage through the Red Sea in April; and on the 6th May Lord Crewe
telegraphed to India that the Admiralty had arranged for twelve river gun
boats for Mesopotamia, of which four would be ready for use in October.