File 2764/1904 Pt 5 'Baghdad Railway: Anglo-Turkish negotiations; concessions proposed in respect of Kowait; negotations with Hakki Pasha in London; Anglo-Turkish agreement.' [‎253r] (530/536)

Germany .—The India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. has not heard of any overtures to Germany
on the subject. We know only that in 1909 M. Gwinner informed Sir
E. Cassel that the Germans had no objection to Great Britain obtaining
moie than 50 pel cent., and that it was from Hussein Hilmi that the
opposition then came. Further, in 1911, Sir G. Lowther wrote (No. 183,
of 22nd March) “ Prominent Germans here have recently been hinting that
“ the Turks will have to accept any arrangement come to between Berlin and
“ London . . . and that we perhaps could secure a more satisfactory
“ arrangement by unofficial 'pourparlers with Germany.” He understood
that the German Ambassador (Baron Marsehall), who was just going to
Berlin, would speak in this sense.
To these facts, which are all that are available, must be added the
consideration, already mentioned, that it is in Germany’s interest that the
Gulf section should be built, and she is therefore not likely to place
unnecessary difficulties in the way of anyone who will find the money. It is,
indeed, probable that she will ask a quid pro quo. Whether her demand
will be excessive cannot be known until it is made. But it will doubtless
be a matter for bargaining, and in any case it is a question whether it is not
better to pay Germany for something that is worth having, than Turkey for
something that is not.
Turkey .—The Turkish attitude may possibly be hostile. For positive
information w r e have only M. Gwinner’s statement quoted above. But it is
known that Turkey is very suspicious of British designs in Mesopotamia,
and she will doubtless prefer an international control because of the scope
which it affords for the time-honoured policy of playing off the various
Powers against one another. On the other hand, (1) it is strongly to her
interest that the line should be built; (2) Sir G. Lowther in his Despatch
No. 328, of 12th May 1911, has given reasons why she need not herself
claim a large share ; (3) she will not necessarily be worse off if we obtain
50 per cent, than under her own proposal. She is content now to ask for
25 per cent., and our proposal will leave her to divide 50 per cent, with
Germany on the best terms she can get.
Nevertheless, let it be assumed that she will object. The considerations
advanced above are intended to show that no harm will result if, as a
consequence, the Bagdad-Basra Railway question is withdrawn from the
present negotiations. It is submitted that His Majesty’s Government would
have a very good case for withdrawing it. Their own attempts to find a
solution will three times have failed, and it is not reasonable to expect them
to go on making overtures to Turkey indefinitely. The Turkish repre
sentatives, at the private conferences which preceded the official reply, made
a great point of the fact that it wms to oblige Great Britain that Turkey had
induced the Germans to renounce their rights. It will now be for His
Majesty’s Government, while expressing thanks for this sign of good will, to
regret that they do not see their way to accept the concession on the terms
on which it is offered. We should say that we have shown our own goodwill
by making three attempts to meet the Turkish wishes ; we will give a still
further proof of it now by withdrawing all objections to the construction of
the railway as far as Basra, by any one to whom they choose to entrust it,
on the sole condition that they conclude with us a thoroughly satisfactory
settlement on the Shat-el-Arab and in the Gulf (including Mohammera), in
return for which we will further give them the increase of Customs duties.