File 756/1917 Pt 1 ‘ARAB BULLETIN Nos 1 to 65’ [‎509r] (1022/1240)

far from probable that he will resign leadership willingly, or that
he will wholeheartedly acquiesce in a pacific policy. If he gets
the chance of persuading the Arabs that Idris has mismanaged
affairs and has made too great concessions to England or to Italy,
he will almost certainly use it as a weapon for the purpose of
ousting Seyyid Idris and regaining his former power. At this
moment Seyyid Idris’s chances of success appear to be very good.
He left the vicinity of Tobruk about April 18 with the
intention of marching ria Jedabia to Jalu to meet Seyyid
Ahmed, who was last reported to be in that neighbourhood.
His first move will no doubt be to detach from Seyyid Ahmed
those of his followers who still adhere to him. When he has
reduced his cousin to impotence, he may succeed in prevailing on
him to retire to Kufra, where he can do little harm.
It appears as if Idris has definitely broken with the
Turkish Government and its emissaries in Northern Africa ; but
it is probable that he will accept from them any arms or money
that they may send him in the hope of gaining him to their side.
He cannot be expected to hand over the Turkish officers as
prisoners of war, but he has undertaken to expel them from
Africa if they fall into Ids hands. Seyyid Ahmed, on the other
hand, is very much under Turkish influence, and there is a
possibility of his joining Nuri, Suleiman Bar uni, and Ramadan
Shitewi, who are believed to be threatening Sirt and endeavouring
to stir up the Arabs in Cyrenaiea against the Italians.
As soon as the Great War is over, it is possible that the
Italian Government will press Idris to carry into effect some of
the conditions of the agreements, the execution of which has
been deferred till circumstances are favourable. The extent to
which he will be able to meet their views will probably depend
on the security of his position amongst the Arabs. He could at
any moment make himself supreme amongst them by adopting a
fanatical policy and proclaiming a holy war against Italy ; but,
before he can make concessions for the purpose ol maintaining
peace and trade, he must be quite certain that he has a sufficient
grip of the Arabs to ensure their acquiescence.
The successful termination of the peace negotiations with
Mohammed Idris is generally known by the western Bedouins,
and the effect on them will probably be good. I hey have
suffered considerably by the feeling ol unrest and the possibility
of further hostilities, and can now settle down to their formei
avocations. While, in the past, no great love was lost between
the Aidad Ali and the Arabs lying further west, there was always
a considerable movement along the coastal zone and on the
inland trade routes. This has only been carried on during the
last nineteen months, at the risk of spoliation by the lurco-
Senussi force, or of arrest by' the British.
On the whole, the Egyptian Bedouin has less to gain by the
re-establishment of peace than his western neighbour, as he ias
not been so reduced by T starvation ; but a great part of the