Coll 6/67(6) 'Boundaries of South-Eastern Arabia and Qatar: Trucial Coast Oil Concessions' [‎192v] (395/402)

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I ft ^ 7 Mnd section IV of the Appendix
e. 15X2/279/ in the Qatar peninsula (see paragraphs 6 and aad paragraph 10 of Colonel
91 (1934). j n) ji a Office memorandum ^ ■, () . u { 0 the Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. );
" 91 (1934). “ IndTaOfffce memorandum B 430 ol ^ Pol meal Resident);
R 1513 / 81 / Dickson’s letter No. C 17 of the 18th J “|’ discu ’ slons it is doubtful whether
91 (1934). but in view of the informal nature o, 1 ment Moreo ver, at this meeting Sir
much reliance can he placed on tl s _ g pus p e( j the Saudi frontier ;k
Percy Cox seems to have suggested a lm P unlikely that on. ins
to the west of the southern part of ^^'^stood^hat was proposed,
point, at any rate, Ibn baud can ha\ ^ ^ doubtful whether this can be
P 25. As regards (b) of although from a practical
regarded as a legal argument m a ^ . would lose much of its force were
point of view it is certainly telling. . nerlt we re, in fact, in a position
there any way of showing that the Sana q we p as the Jebel Nakhsh.
to put forward a valid clam s Gove nm^nt on the 10th July, 1935,
26. At any rate when His A Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
Xy eS recog.dsed the southern frontier of Qatar for the
ris, "S CnTrSiiVE r t. T yjss
S” is; *8""“ ““ , “ i
.^giession. mentioned here that, while the negotiations for the 01 1 con
cession were in progress and before the Sheikh had indicated that he considered
what eventually^became the boundary of the concession area to be the southern
frontier of his State, the territory in respect of which His Majesty s Government
proposed to promise him protection had been defined provisionally as no
extending to the south of a line drawn straight across i rom the head of ti e
Dohat-es-Salwa to the coast immediately north of the ixhor-el-( deid. I ms
so-called “ protection line ” lay in places several miles to the south ot tfte tyatar
frontier as later defined in the oil concession, but its location was never indicated
to the Sheikh, who was simply assured of protection ‘ ‘ against serious and
unprovoked attacks on your territory from outside your frontier.” ^
28. In one important respect the assurance of His Majesty s Government
in respect of the Jebel Nakhsh differs from that in respect of the Khor-el Odeid.
The assurance about the latter was given in 1906, long before the present frontier
dispute had arisen. But the assurance about the former was given—somewhat
incautiously, as has since transpired—six weeks after the Saudi Arabian Govern
ment had put forward, on the 3rd April, 1935, claims which embraced the Jebel
Nakhsh. It can, however, be said that the Qatar frontier as finally recognised
on the 10th July, 1935, was the outcome of occurrences dating from before the
3rd April, 1935. The Saudi Arabian Government protested against the oil
concession at the time.
E. 4734 / 279 /^ 29. With regard to the Saudi claims to this area it will be seen from
91 (1937V paragraph 4 0 f Bushire despatch No. 594—S of the 20th June, 1937, and the dates
in Table B enclosed therein, that Ibn Sand can have very little claim of an
1 “ ancestral” nature to the Jebel Nakhsh. His claim, in fact, rests mainly on
the argument that the tribes which frequent this area owe allegiance to him,
^ 1 4 - Vi -1 4 - rAVA 'rv> /'ATY'i v* h 1 H /"v n / J -1 A -v* Vv -1 -r-k ^ *
vyj. Much of the evidence available, however, tends to confirm the truth of
the Saudi Arabian Government’s contention that many of the inhabitants of the
Jebel Nakhsh owe allegiance to Ibn Sand. In paragraph 4 of his telegram
No. T. 19 of the 11th January, 1934, to the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , Sir T. Fowle observed
that ^ the Sheikh of Qatar is more a large merchant than a ruler and has
practically no authority over the interior of his State .... where the strongest
Bedouin elements are migratory tribes from Saudi Arabia.” This evidence is