'Persia and the Persian Question by the Hon. George Nathaniel Curzon, M.P.' [‎237] (272/714)

THE SEISTAN QUESTION
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English port on the Caspian by any Czar. It is true that Russia
turns longing eyes towards a maritime outlet on the south, and
that of the two methods by which she can possibly attain thereto,
encroachment in a southerly direction from Meshed via Seistan is
one. ihis tact is of course an addition to the prospective value of
Seistan in Russian eyes, but it postulates a condition of affairs so
remote, and I would fain hope so inconceivable, that I will not
expend words upon its further examination.
The negative value of Seistan to Russia is the inverse aspect of
its positive value to Great Britain. In other words, Russia would
Value to •' 10 ^ Seistan herself, in order to prevent
Great Seistan from being got hold of by Great Britain ; and
because, in the latter event, not only would the ambitious
and far-reaching schemes that I have sketched be frustrated, but
England would be in a position very seriously to menace the
Asiatic status of her rival. Let me explain. I have already in
the previous chapter indicated the acute commercial warfare that is
now being waged between Russian and Anglo-Indian merchandise
in Khorasan. I have shown that the advantage which she derives,
and will continue to derive in increasing degree, from the Trans-
caspian Railway enables Russia to flood the markets of North-eastern
Persia with her manufactures, and to undersell her sole competitor,
viz. British India, in the bazaars of Meshed. I have shown that a
critical epoch has been reached, and that without some help, in the
shape of increased facilities of transport or shorter and cheaper trade
routes, Anglo-Indian commerce must in the long run be vanquished.
The one means by which the latter could compete on nearly even
terms with her rival would be by adopting her rival's tactics—by
pushing forward a railway on the south to match the Transcaspian
Railway on the north, by conveying the manufactures of Bombay
as are conveyed the manufactures of Moscow, not solely on mule-
back and camel-back over vast distances at crushing expense, but
by the potent auxiliary agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. of steam. Such a railway starting
from India must point, as its first objective, to Seistan.
The commercial importance of such a line will not, I think, be
denied, as bringing India into closer connection with the bazaars
cu . • , 0 f Khorasan. Not less obvious, however, would be the
btrategical . # 7
impor- strategical advantage, as enabling England to occupy a
flanking position in defence of that Afghan territory
which she has undertaken to safeguard, and as preventing those