File 53/1915 Part IV 'German War: Turkey; Caliphate etc' [‎225r] (446/481)

Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Mark Sykes.
SECTION I.
MILITARY SITUATION IN MESOPOTAMIA.
With regard to the situation in Mesopotamia there are two aspects, the
one political, the other military.
From the military point of view I think the reinforcement of the Army
and the occupation of Baghdad are the two most important considerations.
As matters now stand, our Army is weak in numbers and grows propor
tionately weaker as the enemy gradually recuperates and reinforces at
Baghdad, until he is strong enough to advance in force. It cannot be too
strongly urged that a single defeat is sufficient to procure the destruction
of om* whole force. The population would undoubtedly rise en masse to
plunder and harass our retirement if once they imagined we had turned our
backs, and I personally doubt whether we should be able to withdraw to
Basra under such circumstances. Whether we decide to occup\ Baghua
or not, 1 am certain that the reinforcement of a full division is the least that
the situation demands. . . . ,
If we occupy Baghdad, I think that the military situation is much easier
than before, and that we should feel the strain less for the following reasons.
Once Baghdad is ours the enemy’s facilities for concentration previous to
attack are reduced. Thus so long as he holds Baghdad he can dnbble Ins
reinforcements simultaneously into Baghdad by the Euphrates ligns an
by the Kifri road he can concentrate at Baghdad, and with the hcl]
steamers and current advance with a fairly huge f° lct - , . -
If we hold Baghdad the enemy must either disperse his forces or
concentrate at a point on one of the three lines, and use that line only for
suddIv with the result that the concentration of a large force will be more
difficult "for him to accomplish, and his subsequent advance easier to
check. .♦ r 9 000 men for the maintenance of order in
respective positions. , i a the work in progress. One
L visited the d<«kya r .l at Akulau and sl)0 , ll(i be
boat is ready, and five mou ate . from |st November. There
aide to tek f.£V^ r itt a tlIe w'aVo! construction which appear irremediable;
r 0 ZYof htbou,- diffienbiesof ground, and climate consp.re to make the
“ the operations up ‘Xt
T‘ SSr JaskSotamia. The low trajectory
targets are so doubtlul an. . c disadvantages when the gunboat
of The 4 -inch g„n presents ^'"^Xhhanks against enemies at
has to be used m narrow wate . InventioQS Department might consider
medium ranges 1 sugge. , weapon) or mounting for an existing
the problem of densnig < ' ‘ b k n( |ed accurately on a given point
weapon, which could enable a she to be^i ^ ^ the deck a ves i
o>t a plain 3 b ym-ds from a" bank, 15 feet in height above the
at a point in a umi ^ j
wat.pr line.