File 53/1915 Part IV 'German War: Turkey; Caliphate etc' [‎228r] (452/481)

status ofcor-tam territories, thus permitting the use of British
, 1 r(M 1 v u kalian, or Russian troops in any area.
(<,) Sherif l)le ^ Rtimulate an Ara,J) (leilia «d for the Caliphate of the
Link 2.
A. The second of these lines of policy requires careful management
as we are here making use of Turks against Turks, and consequently run
the risk of compromising our Arabian nationalist asset, since the Arabs are
almost as hostile to the I urktsh Liberals as they are to the Young Turks
themselves. However, this is to be avoided by sti lating among the
Liberals I) the hope of revenge, and (ii) by working on the idea that only to
hem will we accord any Ottoman Independence at all, at the conclusion of
he war. I bus we can make it clear to Turkish Liberals that so long as
the ( ommittee holds office we will give no peace or quarter to the Ottoman
Lmpire, but that it they work a successful revolution we shall be prepared
to negotiate with them at once as regards the independence of regions
where Ottoman I urks are m the majority. It is also possible, though I
hesitate to suggest it, that the Russian Government might be prepared to
make concessions to the Tinkish Liberals with regard to the status of Con
stantinople. I’his, however, would be a matter which should lie between
Russia and the Liberals alone.
B. As regards the second portion of this line, it consists in being
prepared with a policy whereby the Ottoman Ulema shall continue to enjoy
their present properties and privileges in all the ancient provinces of the
Ottoman Empire, no matter under whose jurisdiction or protection it may
fall ; and guaranteeing all shrines and vvakfs in (Constantinople and the
pio\ lines, u ith the exception of Santa Sofia, for which compensation shall
be allowed. I his in itself is a great asset against the Committee, as the
Ulema know full well that their revenues will be lost if the Committee
prosecute the war to a successful issue.
To encourage Aran Ulema to get Turkish Ulema to fall in with the idea
of a vSherilian Caliphate would be profitable if carefully handled.
Line 3.
This is merely a matter of co-ordination and organisation. It requires
an expert political and literary stalf in touch with all quarters of the Islamic
areas, and with local agencies at various centres.
The system should be for the central staff to give the general line to the
local agencies, and for the local agencies to pursue that line in the manner
most suitable.
The general purpose is to produce an atmosphere favourable to us among
Moslems generally, and to combat the propaganda direct and indirect of our
enemies. As a general rule it will he found that educated conservatism and
orthodoxy are on our side and modernism and ignorant fanatioism are
against us, for reasons explained in my Despatch No. 17, and already dealt
with under Section II. of this memorandum.
A. To mobilise oar full force, we must make the situation clear to all
British officers engaged in the Islamic area ; and we must as far as possible ^ /
work our own press, both at home and in India and Egypt, by supplying ^ ^//T
paragraphs, articles, and private memoranda, and by checking the publica
tion of unsatisfactory or dangerous matter, ft may be mentioned here that
the attuning and education of our own people is qu te as important as the
influencing of our Mohammedan subjects.
B. We should be ready to squash without hesitation any article,
paragraph, or observation in any native newspaper which was of a philo-
Cominittee nature, particularly the kind of contribution which is subtle and
indirect, as in the enclosed article in the Hindnstan Review/*
(!. We should promote the spread of rumours, prophecies, saws, rhymes,
crvptograms, and anagrams favourable to our side, by means of native
Not reproduced.