File 53/1915 Part IV 'German War: Turkey; Caliphate etc' [‎229r] (454/481)

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(2) Remain on the defensive in Armenia, and devote his attention to
winning back Mesopotamia and to attacking Kgypt from Syria.
(3) Assume the offensive in all three regions.
Whichever of these courses the enemy adopts, he has certain factors
which militate in his disfavour.
(1) The difficulty of approaching Egypt after he has passed rail head.
( 2 ) 'Idle length of communication between Baghdad and Ras-ul-Ain
where his railway ceases to be of real use to him.
(3) The separation of his forces in Armenia from those in Syria and
Mesopotamia.
(4) The badness of the eastward roads from the Angora rail head to the
Caucasus.
I think it is probable that ( 1 ) if lie adopts course 1 he will send 2 ) 00,000
men to Armenia, 30,000 to Syria, and 50,000 to Mesopotamia. (2) If he
adopts course 2 he will send 100,000 men to Armenia, 200,000 to Syria,
and 100,000 to Mesopotamia. (3) If he adopts course 3 he will send
150,000 men to Armenia, 150,000 to Syria, and 100,000 to Mesopotamia.
The movement and supply of such large forces will naturally be slow,
and 10 per cent, losses from desertion and sickness per quarter may be
anticipated. In any event, it would appear advisable, if it be possible, for
the Allies to spare the men, to block the exit from the Cicilian Gates. If
this be accomplished before the enemy’s troops are released he will have
relatively small forces at his disposal in Syria and Mesopotamia, and no
means of greatly increasing their numbers before the month of April.
As the Syrian and Mesopotamian winter is comparatively mild this
should give the Allies an opportunity of occupying practically the whole of
the Arab speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and of cutting off the
enemy from his indirect activities in Persia, Afghanistan, and Arabia.
If by the Kith of March the Allies could dispose of their forces as shown
nn Man 2 in the following strengths, with lines of communication as
- 50,000
- 20,000
•- 50,000
- 10,000
- 14,000
- 20,000
104,000
- 30,000
194,000
marked :—
Adana
A intab
Diarbekir
Aleppo
Acre-Jerusalem
Baghdad
Line of communications
be Turkish forces would be unable to reconquer their Arabian Empire
wing to the difficulty of concentrating and deploying at the decisive
>oints. —
d) Communication with the Russian army could be established through
the Bitlis pass. i ai i
(2i The two small Turkish armies, presumably at Damascus and Mosul,
could be dealt with at leisure. . c . .
(3) A provisional native government could be established in Byna and
trade reopened with the whole of the Syrian poits.
( 4 ) Knemy activities in Persia, Afghanistan, and Arabia would naturally
come to an end. ,
(5) The Aleppo-Deir Zor-Baghdad trade route coiild be re-opened.
( 6 ) Direct negotiations for the recognition of tl.e independence of the
rfherif could be begun.
C) The Mlies could, in the event of the European s.tuat.on proving
favourable envisage a peace conference with the certainty that
the Ottoman Empire would be reduced to Anatolia Peninsula that forms most of modern-day Turkey. , although
Constantinople might still remain in Ottoman hands.
N B—A modification of the above scheme wouhl consist m eliminating
the fote defined for Diarbekir and holding the lute Marash-B.rejik-
S. 289.
1)