File 1187/1914 Pt 2 ‘Persia – Policy. British Interests in the South. Russian Policy’ [‎249r] (245/300)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.!
PE K SI A AND CENTRAL ASIA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
> ) [September 8 .
Section 12 .
[47403]
No. 1 .
Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 8.)
(No. 227. Very Confidential.)
Sir
’ t >t ■, • , . . . Tehran, August 3, 1914.
IN accordance with the instructions contained in your teleeram Nn ttio
14th u timo, I dealt in my telegram No. 203 of the 23rd ultimo with what appeared to
t i e m °i St lm P° rtant P omt f touched upon m the letter from the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. of
the 29th June last upon the subject of the rehabilitation of British interests in
No^l69^ of S the^ls^ultnno. ^ t0 t0 me with des P atch
t adove “ men ^ 0 / ie d l^ e ^ ram I expressed my concurrence with the broad lines
of the telegram from the Viceroy of India of the 11 th June last if His Majesty’s
Government had made up their mind that British intervention in the south has become
imperative, and that Persian independence and integrity can no longer be maintained
even m effigy. It is true that recent Russian actions in Northern and Central Persia
have robbed those sonorous words of any effective meaning; but it appears to me hard
to shut one s eves to the fact that the policy advocated must inevitabD lead to a
partition, at a, sooner or later date. It is possible that the Marquess of Crewe may be
right when his Lordship expresses the opinion that the proposed measures, carried* out
in the spirit which animates His Majesty’s Government, would in reality tend actively
to promote the_independence and integrity of Persia. It is clear that such would not
be the impression made upon the average mind, and I think that it would be fairly
safe to assert that such would not be their actual result. It is probable that this
desirable aim might be achieved were His Majesty’s Government alone in the field to
grapple with the Persian question, but it is clear that the Russians would not under
stand such a policy in this light, and that they would adopt an attitude in Northern
Persia that would force the hand of His Majesty’s Government, and leave but little left
of the phantom of Persian independence and integrity.
j The Russian reproach that His Majesty’s Government would appear to be seeking
the monopoly of railway construction in the neutral zone made it amply clear, though
I have been more than once assured to the contrary by M. Korostovetz, that the
Government of St. Petersburgh is by no means prepared to let Great Britain have a free
hand in that zone, in which all our most important commercial interests are concen
trated. Such being the case, it would appear most desirable that no revision of the
zones should be attempted, but that the tacit consent of the Russian Government
should be secured by diplomatic methods to our taking the necessary measures to
protect our interests already long established before the convention of 1907.
• It is the difficult problem of how to safeguard British interests in the neutral zone,
in face of steady Russian penetration southwards, which has caused me to cast about
in an effort to disc ove r some alternative sc heme acceptable to both parties which might
obviate a consideration offhertiwEward^question of the neutral zone. The subject has
ieen gone into fully in an accom panying despatch, and I need only add here, in
connection with the neutral zoneTFifficuTty, fL'aFTT would appear to me that it will be
v ery hard to secure our position in the Gulf and lands bordering thereon unless some
anangement is reached with Russia under which she agrees not to push her influence
urther south. Persians are very susceptible to external influences, and, as long as
hussia appears to hold a predominant position in Central Persia, we shall never be
able to rely with any amount of confidence upon the loyalty of tribal friends, unless we
ake practical steps to bind them to us by more than moral ties.
;* As regards the attitude that should be adopted towards Sheikh Khazal and his
cus in order to strengthen our position in Arabistan, I feel that I am not qualified to
give an opinion, and that His Majestj-’s Government can be much better guided in this
uiatter by the local authorities in the Gulf region. I would merely observe that it
vouid appear to me that, in dealing with the nature of protection can be properly
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