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truculence so far as to picket the latter’s offices and prevent—not without a few
broken heads—all access to their offices. The lorries of Bureau Perse were
apparently allowed neither to leave their garage nor to enter it, the drivers
being forced to dump in the roadway the goods they had brought from the
interior. The methods employed were, it seems, after the best Hindu passive
resistance precedents, men lying down in front of the lorries so as to make it
impossible for them to move-
2. This boycott was undoubtedly the culmination of the efforts which the
late Minister of Court made throughout the summer to persuade Persian
merchants in general that it would be to their advantage in the long run to show
a united front against Soviet Russia’s trade methods, which were as calamitous
to the individual merchant as they were insulting to the dignity of the State.
The members of the Iran Trading Corporation were egged on by the promise
that all commercial transactions with Soviet Russia would be centralized in their
hands should the movement prove successful. The Director of the Department
of Commerce spent the week ending December 17th in Gilan and he was reported
at the time to have advised the merchants to have no individual dealings with
the Russians. It is almost certain that he gave the final touch to the plans
for the boycott previously laid by Teymourtache. (I hear in this connection
Yassai received a most violently worded letter from the Russian Trade Repre
sentative two days ago protesting against his recent activities in Gilan and
laying the organization of the boycott at his door—to which Yassai has perforce
given the lie.) It is also rumoured that the police of Gilan provided some of
the pickets mentioned above on the instructions of the Tehran police head-
quarters ; while the local Governor, Divanbegi, a creature of Teymourtache, is
said to have shown himself rabidly anti-Russian. He has since been recalled to
Tehran, but I am unaware whether for consultation or as a sacrifice to Russian
wrath.
3. According to a source which should be reliable the Russian reaction took
the form of three ultimata which were delivered on January 1st :—
(a) The agent of the Russian Trade Representative in Gilan was ordered
to inform the Governor that if the boycott was not called off before
January 5th, all Russian trade organizations in Gilan would be
closed forthwith and the personnel sent back to Russia.
(b) Yassai was informed that all Russian purchases would cease if the
boycott continued.
(c) The Chief of the Tehran Municipality, who is also Comptroller-
General to the Shah, was informed that in view of the transport
difficulties resulting from the boycott there would be no ship avail
able to transport the rice which the Russians had hitherto agreed
to buy from His Majesty—one understands the whole of his
substantial crop, while no other Persian rice of this year’s output
has been bought in Gilan or Mazanderan up to now, to the intense
distress of these two provinces.
4. The third ultimatum, if it can be called that, was withdrawn at the last
moment “so as not to embitter the conflict ”, the Russians realizing perfectly
well that the threat would already have produced its effect.
5. The boycott, it will be noted, took place in spite of the Minister of Court’s
dismissal—probably because nobody had thought of altering or delaying the
execution of orders already given—but his absence must have been keenly felt
when the Council of Ministers met on January 2nd in the presence of the Shah
to discuss the situation.
6. It was finally agreed according to my informant that instructions should
be telegraphed to local governors to take no part in the boycott, the official
attitude of the Government being a neutral one, and at the same time (one
imagines) to exert a restraining influence on the merchants. Feroughi and
yassai were also detailed to interview the Russian Trade Representative,
showing themselves conciliatory but to give ground slowly in an endeavour to
save the Persian Government’s prestige and obtain all possible concessions.
Tins policy was, very possibly, laid down by Teymourtache who must have
foreseen the result of the boycott he advocated with a view to bringing matters
to a head. The shadow of the Minister of Court still hangs over the Cabinet.
7. A report which reached the Legation subsequently w T as to the effect that
tins interview, which took place on the 3rd January, proved most satisfactory
tno I ersians telegraphing to Resht to put an end to the boycott in its active and