Coll 28/85S (2) ‘Persia; Abadan situation 1946; Policy to be pursued by H.M.G. (Recommendations & General Appreciation).’ [‎30r] (59/84)

Sk ^This telegram is of particular secrecy and should "be retained
by the authorised recipient am not passed on/
DIPLQ^TIC oECHaT
FilQ,, FaililG^ QPFlOn 10 TEnmu
No. 621.
14th June, 1946
D. 3*10 p.m. 13 th June, 1946
SECRET
DEDIP,
I should like you to consider urgently what positive
steps might now be taken in the oilfields area to check the
present trend of events, which is rapidly placing the Russian
controlled Tudeh Party in a controlling position. If the
situation is allowed to drift, it will almost certainly
deteriorate. The Persian Prime Minister is already hinting
at the possibility of including a Tudeh representative in
his Government. The result of the forthcoming elections may
in any case bring the Tudeh Party into power in Tehran. If
therefore there are any precautionary measures which we could
usefully take in South Persia to protect British interests
before the Tudeh. Party have consolidated their position in
Tehran, we have obviously no time to lose.
2. For your own most secret information, I should explain
that any cutting off of Abadan*s supplies of oil would at the
present time have disastrous economic consequences in the
United Kingdom and throughout the Empire. It is therefore a
matter of vital importance to do whatever is possible to
prevent the Tudeh Party, at Russian instigation, from taking
any action which would result in cutting off these oil supplies.
3. It is obviously necessary in these circumstances for the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to defend themselves against Tuueh'
criticism by generous treatment of their Persian workmen and
by encouraging the growth of a genuine trade union movement
among them. But such measures, desirable as they &re in
themselves, will obviously not be sufficient to guard us against
wanton Tudeh interference with the Company*s operations under
their concession. After all, the stimulus behind the recent'
agitation against the Company is not so much a genuine concern
for the welfare of Persian workmen as a political campaign'
against British interests as such.
4. The essential point seems to me to secure the removal of
political agitators from any key positions which they at present
occupy, in South west Persia. Any irresponsible Tudeh leaders
in important positions in which they might be able to injure
the Ail.O.C.*s operations should be replaced by reputable men
in whom the Company have confidence. Action to achieve these
ends will have to be planned in the knowledge that it may have
to be taken without the*co-operation, ana perhaps against the
wishes, of the Tehran Government, and I # should like you to
consider how the local Governor and/or police authorities can
be stimulated to show sufficient local indepenaence to prevent
our plans being interfered with by orders from Tehran. It may
well