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Coll 28/85S (2) ‘Persia; Abadan situation 1946; Policy to be pursued by H.M.G. (Recommendations & General Appreciation).’ [38r] (75/84)
The record is made up of 1 file (40 folios). It was created in 18 Jul 1946-1 Nov 1946. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .
Transcription
This transcription is created automatically. It may contain errors.
PSK3IA,
Tehran despatch Ho. 228 of 1st July.
The picture which Mr. Le Rougetel draws in this despatch
is that under Soviet Communist direction an attempt is "being
made to eliminate British influence from Persia altogether
and that the Tudeh Party, which, although originally composed
of progressive left-wing elements without any ideological
affiliation, is now closely connected with the Communist
Party, la "being used as the instrument of this purpose.
Since the principal source of British influence in Persia is
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the Company is the natural
object of attack and the Party have been working by every
means to undermine its position.
On the political side, Mr. Le Rougetel’s proposals for
immediate action are:-
Propaganda on the lines laid down in his general
recommendation No. 1.
To continue our efforts to wean the Prime Minister away from
his association with the Tudeh Party and from one or two
Ministers in his immediate entourage who are entirely under
Oonmunist influence. Kr. Le Rougetel emphasises the Importance
of losing no opportunity to win him over. Our main purpose
should be to ensure that the Persian Government do not put
their full weight behind the Tudeh Party machine and that they
allow reasonable scopie to our propaganda.
Progressive elements should be encouraged to look to us rather
than to the Tudeh 1 arty and if possible we should encourage
the formation of a new progressive part on democratic lines.
This recommendation leads on naturally to Mr. Le Rougetel* s
principal industrial recommendation, items ( 1 ) to ( 3 ) of his
special recommendations.
So far as propaganda la concerned, you have already
authorised action and we have confirmed to Mr. Le Rougetel
that he can go ahead. A vigorous propaganda campaing was
incidentally one of the chief recommendations of the
Parliamentary delegation which has just been to Persia.
On the general political side, Mr. Le Rougetel’s
recommendation that we should attempt to win over the Prime
Minister and prevent him so far as possible becoming a
complete Russian tool is the policy which we have been
pursuing. The Persian Prime Minister has just taken action
which makes it easier for us to support him, since he has
formed a "Persian Democratic Party" with a programme which
covers most of the main points of the 1944 Tudeh programme and
goes into much greater detail. Persians of all parties are of
course much better at producing programmes than at carrying
them out, but it is encoura :ing that the Persian Prime Minister
should have taken this step. Much will depend on the sort of
people he gets into his party and we shall have to watch this
carefully. Meanwhile, I am not sure how far, in view of this
new development, Mr. Le Rougetel still wishes that we ourselves
should encourage the formation of yet another progressive
party. It runs counter to your own feeling that the Tudeh
Party may yet be the Party of the future. I think it would be
/worth
About this item
- Content
Secret papers and correspondence concerning the British Government’s response to the potential threat of Soviet Communist penetration in Persia [Iran] and a perceived increase in influence of the Tudeh Party within the Persian Government. The political crisis was triggered by events at the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s refinery at Abadan in July 1946, covered in full in Coll 28/85S (1) ‘Persia. Abadan and S. W. Persian oilfields; Protection of British interests.’ (IOR/L/PS/12/3490A).
The papers include: an appreciation of the political situation in Persia, along with recommendations for British propaganda activities to counter the Soviet threat, prepared by HM Ambassador at Tehran, John Haller Le Rougetel; a response to Le Rougetel’s recommendations, prepared by the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Robert George Howe; a further response to Le Rougetel’s recommendations from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Hugh Weightman; instructions sent by Le Rougtel to British consular officials in Persia, in response to events at Abadan.
- Extent and format
- 1 file (40 folios)
- Arrangement
The papers are arranged in approximate chronological order from the rear to the front of the file.
- Physical characteristics
Foliation: the foliation sequence (used for referencing) commences at the front cover with 1, and terminates at the inside back cover with 42; these numbers are written in pencil, are circled, and are located in the top right corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. side of each folio. A previous foliation sequence, which is also circled, has been superseded and therefore crossed out.
- Written in
- English in Latin script View the complete information for this record
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Coll 28/85S (2) ‘Persia; Abadan situation 1946; Policy to be pursued by H.M.G. (Recommendations & General Appreciation).’ [38r] (75/84), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/12/3491A, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100055625205.0x00004c> [accessed 7 May 2024]
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- Reference
- IOR/L/PS/12/3491A
- Title
- Coll 28/85S (2) ‘Persia; Abadan situation 1946; Policy to be pursued by H.M.G. (Recommendations & General Appreciation).’
- Pages
- front, front-i, 2r:41v, back-i, back
- Author
- East India Company, the Board of Control, the India Office, or other British Government Department
- Usage terms
- Open Government Licence