Coll 6/67(1) 'Boundaries of South-Eastern Arabia and Qatar.' [‎272v] (549/794)

Bre. to G. of
L, 1668,
26.5.13,
P. 2448/13.
Capt.
Shakespear
to Pol. Res.,
Ro. C. 10,
15.5.13.
as far south as the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Dowasir. . . . He asserts that he had made no
professions (at the time of the expedition against him in 1910 of the Sherif: of
Mecca) of being the vassal of the Sultan, and being a Wahabi does not admit
the Sultan’s Khalifate in Islam. . . . The As Sand . . . above all desired*
to be in relations with the British Government so that the Turkish ^Govern
ment would hesitate to oppress them or to interfere m their affairs m Nejd. . . »
The new regime in Constantinople had already shown their aggressive policy,
and he feared that before very many years there would be another attempt
to subjugate Hejd. I hough the Wahabis had formerly fought us m regard
to the coastal Chiefs’ affairs, they saw the benefit of our rule amongst them
and had no wish to alter the present position, though Abdul Aziz mentioned
having received a letter from Dibai, whose Sheikhs had written, after the
Hyacinth gun-running incident, asking to be taken under his protection.
On enquiring how he reconciled the regular receipt of a Turkish annuity
with the claim to absolute independence, Abdul Aziz said that the annuity
dated from the time of his father’s incarceration in Bagdad, was given
then for his living expenses, and has continued ever since his transfer to
Abdul Rahman ; it amounts to only £T.60 per mensem. The As Sand have
never received anything else from the Turks in the way of subsidies, and
on his father’s death Abdul Aziz proposes to allow his subsidy to lapse. All
the correspondence they had had with the Turkish officials has been of a
diplomatic nature, either to effect the removal of troops on the pretext of
a show of submission, or to settle any other difficulties as they arose.”
149. The question of policy was again considered between the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. and
the Foreign Office on the receipt of Captain Shakespear’s report. It was agreed,
however, that it seemed preferable to hold to the existing policy unless the Govern
ment of India should propose a departure from it, when the question could be
again considered.
The Anglo-Turkish Convention of July 1913.
150. Between 1911 and 1913 H.M. Government were engaged in negotiations
with the Turkish Government on the various matters in dispute between them in
the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. area. In July 1913 a Convention was initialled under which
Turkey—
(a) recognised Koweit as an autonomous Kaza of the Ottoman Empire and
accepted as valid the Sheikh’s agreement with H.M. Government;
(b) abandoned all its claims and rights in respect of El Qatr, H.M. Government
undertaking not to allow Bahrein to interfere with the internal affairs of
Qatar, to infringe its autonomy, or to annex it;
(c) agreed that the eastern boundary of the Turkish Sanjak of Nejd should be
represented by a line running due south from the head of the gulf
opposite Zaknuniyeh island, which formed part of the said Sanjak, to the
twentieth parallel of latitude in the Rub’ al Khali.
Further meeting between Captain Shakespear and Ibn Saud, May 1913.
151. On 15th May 1913 Captain Shakespear, then Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. , Koweit,
reported that he had met Ibn Sand in the course of a recent tour, in the Koweit
hinterland, and had spent four days with him. In the course of the visit
Ibn Saud had discussed his future policy with great frankness with Captain
Shakespear, who was in close personal relations with him. Captain Shakespear
submitted a detailed report of his discussions, from which the following extracts,
bearing on the matters now under discussion, are relevant:—
152. He, Ibn Saud, according to Captain Shakespear, stated that “ his power
in Central Arabia had increased till he no longer feared any of its Sheikhs or
rulers; he was, moreover, in alliance with all of them, excepting only one, viz. :
the Sharif of Mecca, who, fearing a second Wahabi invasion of the Hejaz, had
therefore allied himself with the Turks. The As Saud were prepared to hold
what they had recovered during the last 15 years of their ancient dominion in
Arabia, and felt capable of being able to do so comparatively easily but for the
menace of Turkish aggression only possible from the East by way of Hasa and
from the West by Mecca and Medina. To withstand the Turks from both
directions they felt was beyond their strength, and to render secure their eastern