Coll 28/67 ‘Persia. Annual Reports, 1932–’ [‎267v] (534/644)

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7. Allied defeats in the South Pacific in the spring and in Africa in the
summer contributed to this state of affairs, but it was all too obvious that pro
crastination and obstruction, even to the most reasonable demands, are second
nature to the Persian and are unlikely to be abolished by any treaty.
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A nqlo-Persian Relations.
8. As will be seen from subsequent paragraphs, the war forced HiC
^ Majesty’s Legation and the British Military Authorities to interest themselve V,
closely in almost every sphere of Persian administration, owing to the necessity
for developing and protecting Persia’s means of communication to bring supplies
to Russia, and also owing to the compelling need for saving shipping space. No
less than 4,000 miles of road were built, or repaired and maintained by British
engineers all Over Persia; no fewer than twenty-nine modern aerodromes, many
with cement runways, were constructed or were under construction; a large road
transport organisation was built up by the United Kingdom Commercial Corpora
tion, and a constant stream of modern lorries poured across the desolate passes of
Persia carrying arms and supplies to Russia. The Trans-Iranian Railway was
taken over by the Allies; North of Tehran it was under Russian, South of Tehran
under British control. The tonnage carried on the railway was increased beyond
recognition ; a new branch-line was built, connecting Khorramshahr and Ahwaz
and to the port of Tanouma. The military authorities employed on roads and
aerodromes alone about 70,000 Persian labourers and thus became one of the
largest employers of labour in the whole country. The need for protecting these
lines of communication led us into some queer fields; we were forced to take an
interest in tribal policy to secure peace in districts adjoining vital roads and
railways; we were obliged to interfere frequently and radically in the local
administration which often showed itself incapable of facing w T ar problems; we
w r ere obliged to ask for special security measures to be taken by the Persian
Government to deal with suspects.
9. The compelling need to save shipping also forced us into a considerable
degree of interference in local affairs. How this led us into largely controlling-
road transport in Persia and into exercising a considerable influence on Persian
agriculture, and how a Combined Supplies Committee was set up by which the
foreign trade of Persia was virtually planned and controlled by English and
American experts working under the Middle East Supply Centre in Cairo, will be
seen from the following paragraphs.
. 10. While our influence in Persia grew enormously as the year proceeded, it ,
cannot be said that our popularity grew with it. After the Allied defeats in the
Far East and South Pacific, in Africa and in South Russia, during the spring and
summer, it was natural that many Persians should hesitate to throw in their lot
with us, or identify themselves with the Allied cause. The Allied victories in
Africa and still more in Russia in the autumn largely convinced Persians, how
ever, that the Allies would win the war. But there was another reason for our
lack of success with the Persian public. The measures we had to urge on the
Persian Government were not, for the most part, popular ones. The ruling
classes of landowners and merchants found us opposed to their hoarding and
speculation, and objected to the necessary measures of rationalisation and control,
especially of transport and of food and other commodities, which were essential
if Persia was to face the problems of the times successfully. The mass of the
Persian people, who should have benefitted by these measures, either were too
apathetic to care, or only blamed us for the gross corruption and inefficiency which
characterised their application. For years it has been the practice to blame the
British for all Persian troubles and shortcomings. We were blamed by the public
for all Reza Shah’s extortions; for all the food and transport shortages. Did the
British supply food to Tehran from the British zone even to the extent of some
local shortages there? I hat was their fault. Did the Russians refuse to supply
wheat to 4 ehran ? 1 he man in the bazaar merely whispered how much better
conditions were in the Russian zone.
11. This attitude ol the Persian people presents a problem of which our
extensive and many-sided propaganda, started all over Persia during the year by
the Public Relations Bureau of this legation, has so far only been able to touch
the fiange I doubt whether any economic concessions which it was in our power
to make would have made any difference to it, and although we shall do our very
best to undermine it, I fear we must expect it to persist and to colour Persian
policy to some extent for years to come. Meanwhile, the corrupt upper class.