Coll 28/67 ‘Persia. Annual Reports, 1932–’ [‎303v] (606/644)

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137. Indiscipline among all ranks of officers attains serious proportio .
The recipient of an unpalatable order will evade it by mahngering, procias i <
tion or bribery; or, if these methods fail, obtain the support of a Majlis Deputy
to air his grievances. In the last resort he may purchase the vituperative skill
of a journalist, who will pour out in his columns such a torrent of slander on the
author of the order that he will be glad to rescind the ordei m 0,( 11 1 ‘ C
relief. • i
138. To dissipate the gloom of this picture of the Persian army there are
some bright features. . , . , * , •
139. The American military mission has obtained some much-needed equip
ment, chiefly medical stores, clothing, boots, and 600 trucks. Two further long
lists of stores have been forwarded to the United States. . „ ,
140. The mission has laid down a rudimentary organisation tor the issue,
control and maintenance of military transport and a system of supply depots
which will check the widespread misappropriation of stores at the centre, hut.
because control ceases as soon as issues leave the depots, will not eliminate petty
peculation by commanders of units. A scheme for centralised recruit trainmg a
divisional centres instead of in regiments met with such opposition that it had
to be abandoned. . . ,.
141. As a result of certain successful minor operations to disarm the tribes,
of which particulars are given under the Tribal Affairs Section, the morale of the
troops has improved, and provided that the General Staff refrain from operations
beyond their means, this improvement should continue as the memories ot the
inglorious collapse before the British and Russian tioops in August 1 • grow
dimmer. ■,. •
142 Stalin’s tanks and aircraft have never materialised. The conditions
subsequently attached to the offer stipulated that the units of mixed Russia*! and
Persian personnel which were to be formed for the purpose of training m these
arms were to be under the command of Soviet officers, who were themselves to be
under the command of the Red army; that the Persian personnel were to be
selected with the approval of the Russian commander, and that the units were
not to be removed from their appointed places of training (Meshed and Kazvin),
nor could the material be used for any other purpose without the approval ot the
Red army. These conditions were too full of alarming possibilities to be accept
able to the Persian Government, who replied that they would accept the material
gladly—without conditions. The offer was thereupon angrily withdrawn.
Persian Gendarmerie.
143. In the gendarmerie, as in the army, plans for improvement are held up
bv lack of funds. The credit demanded by Colonel Schwarzkopf for the modified
organisation he had in view for the current year, that is, eighteen regiments of
gendarmerie with a total strength of 28,000—the number he considers to be
reallv necessary is 40,000—amounted to 600 million rials. 1 he amount allotted
in the budget by Dr. Millspaugh is 290 million rials, which is the bare cost of ten
regiments at the increased rates of pay; these rates are, in fact, the minimum at
which officers and men can be expected to refrain from partnership with brigands
and thieves. Even among gendarmerie officers the opinion is forming that in the
present financial and economic situation of the country the interests of internal
security would be better served by devoting the available resources to the army
and the police. Colonel Schwarzkopf’s insistence that the gendarmerie should be
independent of the army has accentuated the lack of co-operation that became
immediately evident when the force passed from the control of the Ministry of
War to that of the Interior.
144. Colonel Schwarzkopf’s mission has now been completed to the maximum
strength of six officers sanctioned by the United States. Although Colonel
Schwarzkopf has extensive powers it is obvious that six officers can exercise no
very effective influence over the actions of personnel scattered in small packets
over an area of 628,000 square miles, and consequently in the provinces gendar
merie shows no improvement as the result of Colonel Schwarzkopf’s eighteen
months’ hard work.
145. Encouraged by some Deputies and other influential persons who would
like to see the gendarmerie established in a more important position than the
army, he aims at an organisation which he estimates would require three years to
build 5 up and whose cost would be justifiable only if the army were reduced to a
small striking force. However desirable that might be, it does not seem to be
realisable in the near future; and it is the efficiency of the gendarmerie in the
near future that is of primary interest to us. Towards that very little progress is