Coll 28/67 ‘Persia. Annual Reports, 1932–’ [‎312r] (625/644)

vs
ot the central garrison. Thirty officers were found to have close contacts with
the iudeh party or the Russians and were detained under a clause of the Military
Governorship law until Military Governorship comes to an end. Ten, less deeply
implicated, were sent away to divisions in the south. Further arrests were made
as further details of the mutiny came to light. The Chief of General Staff, on the
strength of the information so far extracted from the captured mutineers, is
of the opinion that a plot for a general uprising existed and that the Meshed
w party acted precipitately, thus causing the general mutiny to go off at half-cock.
Two officers sent by the General Staff to make a full report on the Gunbad-i-Qabus
skirmish and to retrieve the captured vehicles and arms were sent away by the
Russians without being able to complete their task. A party of 200 gendarmes
proceeding by lorry as reinforcements for the gendarmerie at Gunbad-i-Qabus
was turned back by the Russians at Firuzkuh. A lorry conveying bombs for
the Persian air force detachment at Meshed was turned" back by the Russians
at Semnan. Reinforcements for the Meshed garrison coming from Turbat-i-
Sheikh Jan were stopped at the Russian control post south of Meshed. The
fact that the original party of mutineers was able to leave Meshed at all and
pass through the Russian control post en route, the attitude of the Russian-
controlled Tudeh party in Meshed and elsewhere towards the mutiny, and the
presence in Bujnurd of the Russian Vice-Consul at Meshed a few hours prior
to the arrival of the mutineers, add to the growing weight of testimony to
the effect that the whole affair from beginning to end—and the end is not yet
in sight—had the knowledge and approval of the Russians. Subsequently, it
was learnt that most of the officers still at large had joined up with the Azerbaijan
“ Democrat ” rebels and had been given posts in the Azerbaijan People’s army.
Regarding Azerbaijan the sad story can be told in a few words. The Acting
British Consul-General, Tabriz, had more than once stated, even during the
early days of the Democrat movement, that in his opinion the Persian commandeiv
„^ r - would not put up a fight if seriously threatened. Cut off from supplies of food
and clothing, with little or no backing from the Cabinet, surrounded by Red
army soldiers either in uniform or mufti and a populace with scores to settle
for past acts of tyranny by the army, gendarmerie and police, it was not
surprising that they allowed themselves first to be confined to their barracks
by the rebels and later to be disarmed. Of actual fighting there was little, though
some officers are reliably reported to have been murdered in cold blood. The
garrisons surrendered one by one, all, except Rezaieh, showing only token
resistance. Nearly all of the officers have arrived back in Tehran, having been
offered by the rebels the choice of departure or joining the Azerbaijan People’s
army. The 6,000 men of the division, having been told to disperse by their officers,
will have made their own way home. Some few, possibly, may have joined the
rebel army, for which a recruiting drive is in progress. The 150 rials per month
plus uniform and food may attract some. The year 1945, therefore, has been
a bad one for the Persian army.
Gendarmerie.
58. There is no evidence available to indicate any substantial progress,
except perhaps in the capital, in the efficiency of the gendarmerie as a whole.
Co-operation between the army and the gendarmerie is rare, a state of affairs
which precludes any effective measures being implemented for the maintenance
of security throughout the country.
59. Colonel Schwarzkopf, since his return from the United States, has
been obliged, through lack of funds and suitable personnel, to shelve many of
the elaborate reforms contained in the reorganisation scheme to which he has
devoted most of his attention over a period of two years. During the year
under review he has, however, introduced two very essential reforms. Sections
are being increased from six to eight men and no post will eventually have the
^ strength of less than a platoon, i.e., thirty-eight men. His Persian gendarmerie
officers are to be changed round every two years, thereby minimising the
opportunities for graft
60. During the recent disturbances in Azerbaijan the regiments at Tabriz
and Rezaieh were almost completely lost, only some 250 officers and warrant,
officers finding their way back to headquarters in Tehran. There is a scheme to
replace them by two of the seven new regiments which are at present in process
of formation in Tehran. This will bring the total strength of the force up
to eighteen regiments with a grand total of approximately 34,000 officers and