Coll 28/97 ‘Persia. Diaries. Tehran Intelligence Summaries’ [‎46v] (92/749)

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4. In the hope of persuading hoarders to market their stocks, the official ^
price for the purchase of landowners’ surpluses of wheat has been raised from
the prevailing rates, which vary from 1,200 to 1,800 rials according to locality, to
3,500 rials per ton for the districts of Tehran, Western Azerbaijan, Lurestan,
Isfahan and Shiraz, and to 3,000 rials per ton for the rest of Persia. This price
is to apply to past as well as to future deliveries made before the 22nd December.
On that date the buying price will be reduced by 20 per cent., and it may be
subject to further decreases at the discretion of the Government. The official pri^-' "
of bread, however, is to be maintained at 3-60 rials for 3 kilog.
5. It is too early yet to estimate what the effect will be in the provinces of
this increase of price. It has not immediately produced supplies for Tehran,
where the stocks for the feeding of the town are almost exhausted. Supplies
expected from the Northern Provinces have been held up by the Russian military
authorities in spite of assurances by the Soviet Embassy that there was no
objection to its transfer to Tehran. The Persian Government was relying on
the considerable surpluses available in Khorassan and Azerbaijan to feed Tehran
and other deficit areas, and if these do not reach Tehran the situation will be very
serious.
6. The consul-general at Meshed reports that the landlords of Khorassan
have undertaken to deliver 15,671 tons of wheat to Government, of which
2,470 tons have already been delivered. At Kermanshah some landlords have
been arrested for failing to declare their surpluses.
7. The increase of railway charges reported in Summary No. 41/42,
paragraph 5, applies to passenger fares only, and not to freight rates.
Persian Forces.
8. Reinforcements for the Ears and Khuzestan garrisons have recently
been despatched from the Tehran garrison. Two battalions and one mountain
battery have been sent to each area. The battalions for Khuzestan will reinforce
the garrisons in the Behbehan-Gach Saran area.
9. The half-yearly intake of recruits and discharge of time-expired
conscripts is shortly due. There is, however, no transport available to bring the
recruits from the centres in which they have been recruited to their units nor to
convey discharged soldiers to their own districts. As the budget does not allow
of the retention of the soldier due for discharge while the recruit travels from the
recruiting centre to his unit on foot, it seems that units will be under strength
for some weeks.
A yfointments — Military.
10. —(i) Sartip Ibrahim Arfa (M.A. 36) to be Commander of the
2nd (Tehran) Division.
(ii) Sarhang Mansur Muzayyan to be Commander of the 8th (Khorassan)
Division.
(iii) Sarhang Nadir Batmangheli to be Chief of Staff to the 2nd (Tehran)
Division.
(iv) Sarlashkar Ali Asghar Naqdi (M.A. 196) to be head of Military
Tribunals.
(v) Sarhang Salar Khosrodad, from Officer-in-Charge of the Ammunition
Factory An East India Company trading post. , to be Commander of Gendarmerie in the Province of Ears.
(vi) Sartip Mahmud Mirjalali to be Assistant Director of Ordnance Services.
Internal Security.
Fars.
11. There has been no further fighting in Fars. Nasir Qashgai has again
assured the Government (through the Governor of Shiraz, with whom he had
an interview) that he is not a rebel, that he desires only peace, that he is trying
to restrain the tribes, that he will send his brother and mother to Shiraz, but that
he will not come in himself. The Prime Minister states that he has written to
Nasir telling him he must come in to Shiraz or Tehran, guaranteeing him security
if he does, and also saying that the Qashgai tribes must surrender their arms.
There is little hope of any firm action being taken to secure these terms, as the
Government is too preoccupied with economic and currency questions and too
uncertain of its own position; while the Governor-General (and General Officer
Commanding) of Fars, unless pushed by the Government, will prefer compromise
and indecision: The result will probably be a continuance of the uneasy truce