Coll 28/97 ‘Persia. Diaries. Tehran Intelligence Summaries’ [‎88v] (176/749)

■wm 1 ii.,iwai
4
outside the Russian zone, since there is alleged to be sufficient left for the people
of their zone; and the fact that the usual surpluses from the Northern Provinces
have not reached Tehran this year is blamed by the public more on the alleged
British monopoly of civilian transport than on Russian obstructiveness. There
is, however, reason to believe that the people living in the Russian zone are not so
convinced of their good fortune as Russian propaganda would lead others to
believe.
3. It would be unreasonable to suppose that the spread of these ideas i^
displeasing to the Russians or that they do not give them discreet encouragemeir
Whatever post-war objects the Russians have in view, it is unlikely that they
will deliberately forgo the opportunity of paving the way foi* an increase of their
political influence in Persia, even if it is only as a defensive measure against the
spread of British influence, that the Russians remain intensely suspicious of
British (and American) designs in North Persia, and even possibly in the
Caucasus, seems to be indicated by their recent request for an explanation of our
construction of landing grounds in North and East Persia, by the increasing
difficulty experienced in obtaining passes for British officers to visit Azerbaijan,
b\ their refusal to allow the Americans to operate convoys in the Russian zone
and by the gradual extension southwards, although not as yet to any great extent,
of their military posts. It might be unwise to interpret other Russian moves’
such as the reopening of consulates in South and East Persia, their recon
naissance of the^ Perso-Afghan frontier, their recent scientific expedition of
investigation in South-West Persia, their opposition to the grant of authority to
American advisers in Persian administrations, the contract for the manufacture
ot arms whereby Russia may acquire a partial control of certain factories and
industries, the increasing interest they are taking in economic, political and
tribal conditions in Central and South Persia, as steps in a far-reaching political
plan; there are other reasonable explanations. But there is little doubt that the
position of Russia in Persia after the war is likely to be considerably more
advanced, much more closely in contact with important British interests, such
as India, the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. and the Anglo-Persian oil-fields, than before the war.
4. Conditions in Persia to-day are such that the masses will incline towards
anyone who appears to sympathise with their sufferings; there is a growing dis
content among the lower classes against the landowners and the masters of
industry; the contrast between rich and poor is increasingly shameful; in most of
the towns the conditions of the lower classes is appalling, lacking food, clothing,
medicines and education; in many rural districts it is not much better. Russia is
credited with sympathy for the masses; Great Britain is accused of callousness
towards their sufferings. Persians have undoubtedly suffered from the Allies’
utilisation of the country’s communications, from their large demands for
currency and from their purchases of food-stuffs, and that being so it has not been
difficult to persuade the mass of the people that all their ills are the effect of the
actions of the Allies. But, somehow, Russia escapes much of the blame. Con
ditions are lelatively better in the Russian zone, which is, in any case, small
compared with the rest of Persia, which sees only British and American control;
it is Great Britain who restricts imports and controls the railway that should
bring goods and oil from the Gulf; it is the U.K.C.C. who monopolises the civil
transport m the greater part of Persia, It is the British.Minister who has had to
take the lead m bringing pressure on the Persian Government to satisfy Allied
demands.
5. Great Britain is, consequently, probably more unpopular than she has
ever been before. It would be unjustifiable to assume that Russia does not benefit
from this unpopularity or that she fails to encourage comparisons unfavourable to
Great Britain between the Russian and the British attitude towards the people.
What is even more galling is that the behaviour of Russian troops in Persia should
be contrasted favourably with that of British, and that in Tehran the British
should have acquired a reputation for arrogance. Respect and awe of the
Russians are increased by the fulsome praise of the British press.
6. Britain’s unpopularity does not, however, prevent British influence from
being very strong in Persia to-day. Britain is regarded by the majority of the
middle and upper classes as the only real hope of post-war salvation. Some, at
least, of them are conscious that the present economic distress is to some extent due
to the inefficiency and corruption of the governing and propertied classes and are
beginning to realise that the time has come when greater consideration must be
shown to the condition of the masses.
W. A. K. F.
Tehran, April 6, 1043.
x