Coll 28/97 ‘Persia. Diaries. Tehran Intelligence Summaries’ [‎242v] (484/749)

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forces and the streets of the capital were turned into rivers of blood. This was
the blood of young men who had risen up against Hitler, in spite of hunger and
other hardships, with the most primitive weapons, even with sticks. The British
Parliament two evenings ago had supported this ungenerous light with a vote of
confidence for Churchill of 179 to 30. Action similar to this tyrannical action,
with minor differences, was being witnessed in Italy. There also in the name of
the preservation of security, interference was taking place in the destiny of the
people. If the American forces had not been there, perhaps the streets of Home
would have witnessed the same terrible scenes as the streets of Athens, and
Churchill, in the name of the preservation of the rights of the majority, would
have made the Italian people, the real enemies of fascism, targets and would
have set up a Government which was 100 per cent, obedient to the orders of the
Conservatives in London. It was apparent that any Government which was
contrary to the taste or policy of the British Prime Minister and rose up against
the puppets of London was not the representative of the majority of the people.
To establish this view it was not necessary to refer to the votes of the people;
the words of Churchill and the majority of the British Parliament were sufficient
proof. It was not clear that this policy would not extend to France and other
liberated countries and that Churchill, to preserve security, would not interfere
officially in deciding the Government for the whole world. Although the
American Government had expressed its dissatisfaction in Italy and announced
officially that it would on no account interfere in the internal affairs of the
country and that the Italian people, like other peoples of the world, had the right
in accordance with the Atlantic Charter to decide their own destiny and bring to
power any regime and any Government which they pleased, the conduct of
Mr. Churchill’s Government had caused great anxiety among the great masses of
the world. Persians had not detailed knowledge of world affairs, but it seemed
to them that the British Government and the majority in Parliament had caused
affairs, with their rough policy, to reach a critical point. People were already
becoming suspicious of the unity among the Allies. In Persia, over the oil
question and the Government of Sa’ed, the British press had not followed a good
policy. It seemed as if the London press was not much attached to unity among
the Allies. The questions of Belgium, Greece, Italy and Poland confirmed this
view. Did the British Government think the enemy was completely defeated ?
Did it not think that such manifestations might be made use of by Hitler? Was
the real English people in agreement with this policy ? Had the majority in
Parliament voted for the shedding of the blood of the Greek crusaders in
accordance with the desires of the^British people? Were British soldiers in
agreement with Churchill that they should use their arms against their allies who
had shown self-sacrifice and that they should impose upon them a Government
which had not taken the smallest step to help them (the Greek crusaders) in their
struggle? Would history repeat itself? Would reactionary elements and
Conservative diplomats take control of world affairs and keep the peoples in
slavery and darkness? Would parasites and executioners oppress the peoples in
the name of the majority. The paper did not think that this plan would be easily
or profitably accomplished or that the British people could succeed in such a heavy
task.
Rahbar, IQth December, 1944.
LEADER states that Kavtaradzeh had left Persia after a stay of a little over
a month. None of the Persian authorities were prepared to listen to him or to
consider the proposal which he brought. Sa'ed, with the formula “ oil after the
war,” put an obstacle in his way; Dr. Musaddiq went further than this and placed
the responsibility for the exploitation of oil on a Government which could not
even asphalt the streets of its own capital. There was, perhaps, no precedent for
the refusal to consider a proposal brought by the Assistant Commissar for Foreign
Affairs of another country. Supposing" Kavtaradzeh’s proposal had been
inacceptable, what international exigencies could have made it proper to refuse
to consider it? Kavtaradzeh had not left Persia because the oil problem was
solved but because it was apparent that the ruling classes were not prepared to
ask for a solution and were increasing the difficulties in his way. As the paper
had stated before, the object of the Russian Government in applying for an oil
concession was not to obtain an imperialist concession, but on the contrary the
Russian Government had an urgent need to prevent imperialist influence in Persia,
and it considered an oil concession a means of achieving tliis. What Power could
guarantee tliat a second dictator would not appear in Persia after the war and