Coll 28/97 ‘Persia. Diaries. Tehran Intelligence Summaries’ [‎244v] (488/749)

o
elements who may make them their tools. The Russian desire for a security zone^
is natural, since by that is meant a zone adjacent to the Russian people where
those elements will not be allowed to take root. Between the two wars the British
established paramount influence in Persia with the object of making it a base
for hostile action against Russia. They first intended to do so by means of the 4
1919 agreement, but they found a better way by bringing Reza Shah to power.
A situation similar in some respects to that of i918 exists to-day.
4. Another example of this propaganda is attached to this summary as the
first appendix. It is having some effect, inclining Persians to think that Russia
might modify her policy if British influence was less evident and that it might
even be as well if Persians showed themselves to be a little anti-British. They
j are not without justification for believing that hostility to the British is a passport
I to Russian favour.
5. Seyyid Zia recently published in one of the Persian papers a frank and
courageous criticism of Russian policy in Persia. A summary is attached hereto
as the second appendix. It created a considerable impression. The paper
published about five times its usual number of copies, and even then copies were
selling for up to 30s. each. Seyyid Zia’s reputation now stands higher among
his countrymen, but there are some who think that it was his return to Persia
that provoked the Russians to take aggressive measures to counteract British
influence and to prevent the establishment of a pro-British Government.
6. The Prime Minister has tabled a Bill for the establishment of a Supreme
Supervisory Council whose function it would be to make detailed study of Bills
drafted by the Government before they are tabled. Its composition would be the
Ministers without Portfolio, the Under-Secretary of State in the Prime Minister’s
office and five experts in various branches of administration.
7. The Bill for the abrogation of the economic powers of Dr. Millspaugh
has not yet passed the Parliament. The Deputies have now had to face the fact
that it is not easy to find an alternative arrangement for the effective control of
the national economy. Various proposals have been made : the creation of a
Ministry of National Economy; the distribution of economic affairs among
existing ministries; the appointment of a Superior Economic Council who would
continue to control economic affairs through changes of Government; and the
transfer to the present Prime Minister personally of the powers held previously
by Millspaugh. The last proposal has found little favour. There is a fairly
general appreciation that the economy of the country cannot be put on a sound
footing without a long-term programme consistently carried out. This the
Deputies realise would not be the case if full economic powers were to be vested
in anyone so short-lived as a Persian Cabinet Minister. There is now some
appreciation of the advantages there were in having all economic powers
concentrated in the hands of a permanent and impartial official; and as a result
Dr. Millspaugh's stock has gone up.
8. The Independent Front newspapers (see Summary No. 47/44,
paragraph 5) have published a manifesto expressing disapproval of the policy
of the Government whom it accuses of showing hostility to democracy, of illegally
suppressing newspapers, and of general weakness and inactivity.
9. An expert review of the Persian press shows that of 107’papers, including
weeklies, with licence to publish in Tehran, about 70 can be classed as having
negligible influence; very few have a circulation large enough to cover the cost
of publication; 13 draw their inspiration from Russian sources. Not all publish
regularly.
A appointments — civil.
Id- (i) laqi Nabavi (F.0.150—M.A. 188) to be Persian Minister in Portugal;
(ii) Riza Fahimi to be Farmandar of Zinjan;
(iii) Zein ul Abidin Sadri to be Farmandar of Malayer.
Persian Forces.
A rmy..
11. Discord was not long in showing itself between the recently-appointed,
or rather reappointed. Minister for War and the Chief of the General Staff. In
the four months during which there had been no Minister, General Razmara
had done more or less as he liked in the army, and in the provinces, particularly
m the tixfial areas, he had usurped more and more of the functions of the Ministrv
of the Interior. The Shah had become distrustful of his intrigues and ambition;
the Russians were displeased with him since they held him responsible for the