'Military report on Tehran and adjacent Provinces of North-West Persia (including the Caspian Littoral)' [‎264v] (533/610)

482
from Kazvln under Riza Khan Sartip in conjunction with
Saiyid Zia-ud-Din, the journalist who had attacked Mustauli-
ul-Mamalik’s policy in 1918 (see page 45). After their entry
into the city they proceeded to 'arrest all the most prominent
oxandees, who had held Cabinet offices and important provm-
cial Governorships, including Jarman Farma and Sipah balar.
with the object of preventing opposition and of levying forced
contributions of money for the needs of the administration.
Pro-Bolshevik agitators w'ere also arrested. ^ Sipahdar, tne
Prime Minister escaped arrest by taking ‘ bast (Per.) A Persian custom allowing an individual to seek asylum at a designated location. ’ in the British
Legation. No opposition was offered to the revolutionaries,
who set up a Government under Saiyid Zia-ud-Din supporte
by 1 2 * Riza Khan. Their intention, they declared, was to ter
minate the succession of futile and mercenary governments,
which made no attempt to take steps to oppose the Bolshevik
advance likely to follow the withdrawal of the British troops.
The Shah was a terrified nonentity during these events and
perforce recognised this self-constituted Government, 'which
professed their loyalty to him, while expressing their
determination to remove his evil Counsellors. Energetic steps
were immediately taken to raise money for payment of the
troops, who were kept well in hand and a programme of eco
nomy and reform was promulgated and translated into action
with promptitude and enthusiasm. The suddenness, decision
and secrecy of this surprising coup d’etat were most un-Persian,
and British 4 authorship was freely attributed to it both by
Europeans and Persians. In fact, however, the British Legation
was in complete ignorance until the Cossack entry into Tehran,,
and the whole scheme had been planned by Saiyid Zia, who ha
gained the support of the Cossack Officers to carry it out. The
British can be held indirectly to have contributed to it only b}
the presence of their troops at Kazvin, which enabled the
Cossack detachment to march to Tehran without apprehen
sions of the Bolsheviks in their rear.
Saiyid Zia was genuinely anxious for British help, but
considered that this would be facilitated by annulment of the
lament of 19
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^ Meanwhile
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1 The wisdom of such a step is questionable, hut it had more justiflcatiovi
than would at first sight appear. It was generally felt that this reactions
oligarchy of official parasites made reform impossible. They hied th® v -
and absorbed the revenues during their tenure of office, and used their p
to evade taxation.
a He assumed the title of Sardar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. Sipah. ,
8 Some of the persons arrested were Kajars and relations ot the >.nan, e-j-,
the Farman Farma family. „ ,
4 The suspicion of British authorship had unfortunate results m aiienaims.
popular support, and indeed ultimately led to Saiyid Zia’s downfall.
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