File 4931/1916 'Arabia [Nejd]: Bin Saud's subsidy. Payment of subsidy authorised on 1 Jan. 1917. Question of incidence. Payments made without Treasury authority' [‎82v] (173/418)

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On the 13th December, 1915, in his third letter to the Sherif Sir H McMahon
reserved the details of Great Britain’s position in Bagdad vilayet for tuture con-
sideration:—
“ The Government of Great Britain, as I have already informed you, are r
ready to give ad guarantees of assistance and support within their power to the
Arab Kingdom, but their interests demand, as you yourself have recognised a
friendly and stable administration in the vilayet of Bagdad, and the adequate
safeguarding of these interests calls for a much fuller a^id more detaded con
sideration than the present situation and urgency of these negotiations permits
(p. 103).
On the 1st of January, 1916, in his fourth letter to Sir H. McMahon, the Sherif
omitted further discussion of the conditions of British administration, and left the
fixing of the financial compensation (which he had proposed, but to which ills Majesty s
Government had not committed themselves) to His Majesty’s Government s discretion
“ With regard to what had been stated in your honoured communication
concerning al-Irak, as to the matter of compensation for the period of occupation,
we, in order to strengthen the confidence of Great Britain in our attitude and in
our words and actions, really and veritably, and in order to give her evidence of
our certainty and assurance in trusting^ her glorious Government, leave t e
determination of the amount to the perception of her wisdom and justice (p. 112 ).
On the 30th January, 1916, Sir H. McMahon took note of this in his fourth lettei
to the Sherif, and promised to “ take the question into careful consideration when the
enemv has been defeated and the time for peaceful settlement arrives (p. 5, P ar ‘f H).
On the 19th May, 1917, in conversation with Sir Mark Sykes and M. Picot, King
Husein “ admitted the necessity for European advisers to heads of departments, and
referred to Syria and Irak,” but he objected to the suggestion that these advisers must
have executive authority. In an interview on the following day, a declaration by the
King, in answer to a message from the French Governrqent which had been delivered
to him by M. Picot, was read aloud to the following effect : —
“ That His Majesty the King of Hejaz learned with satisfaction that the
French Government approved of Arab national aspirations ; and that, as he had
confidence in Great Britain, he would be content if the French Government pursued
the same policy towards Arab aspirations on the Moslem Syrian Littoral as the
British did in Bagdad.”
On the same occasion Sherif Faisal delivered the following message from his father
to Sir Mark Sykes :—
“We are ready to co-operate with France in Syria to the fullest extent and
with England in Mesopotamia ” lo
King Husein’s view of the results of these two interviews is given in a report by
Captain Lawrence of an illuminating conversation with him on the 29th July, 1917 : — 16
“The King is extremely pleased to have trapped M. Picot into the admission
that France will be satisfied in Syria with the position that Great Britain desires in
Iraq. That, he says, means a temporary occupation of the country for strategical
and political reasons (with probably an annual grant to the Sherif in compensation
and recognition), and concessions in the way of public works. ‘ I was ready
without being asked to guard their interests in the existing railways, and assist
their schools ; but the Hejaz and Syria are like the palm and fingers of one hand,
and I could not have consented to the amputation of any finger or part of a finger
without leaving myself a cripple.’
“ In conclusion, the Sherif remarked on the shortness and informality of
conversations, the absence of written documents, and the fact that the only change
in the situation caused by the meeting was the French renunciation ot the ideas of
annexation, permanent occupation or suzerainty of any part of Syria—‘ but this we
did not embody in a formal treaty, as the war is not finished. I merely read out
my acceptance of the formula as the British in Iraq, proposed to me by M. Picot,
since Sir Mark Sykes assured me that it would put a satisfactory conclusion to the
discussion.’ ’’
14 104269/17. 15 Irak only, or Irak aud Jezireh ? 16 174974/17.