File 4931/1916 'Arabia [Nejd]: Bin Saud's subsidy. Payment of subsidy authorised on 1 Jan. 1917. Question of incidence. Payments made without Treasury authority' [‎185r] (378/418)

Minute Paper.
Department.
< A
From Sir V. Cox, '2()th December 1917.
(Addressed to Foreign, repeated to High Commissioner
Secretary of State for India.)
(Received 9 p.m., 21st.)
( ! 1 °,. G18 7 „ I® continuation of my telegram 6184. As regards military
possibilities, following is gist of I , liilby's messages —-
.ai 1 Q 1 an m H!l r l d It0n a ^' ee that 8ettle,lle,lt of Ajiuan and Awazim questions
witn feheikh of K owe it is a sine qua non to any forward action on the part of
)n baud, (buen settlement, we hope, is assured on lines indicated in my
previous telegram.) J
Hitherto Ibn baud has done no more than keep his son Turki controlling
tubal situation in Qasim and acting as watching outpost, mainly on defensive,
but attacking or seducing i bn Rashid’s tribes as opportunity offered. Ibn
baud asks us to recognise, however, that by so doing he has at least rendered
it impossible for Ibn Rashid to divert strength towards Mesopotamia.
As regards armament, Ibn baud estimates that Ibn Rashid has 20,000
good modern rifles and at least five mountain guns, and can muster 15,000
tribesmen ; whereas he himself has seven serviceable mountain guns, four
machine guns, and about 8,000 rifles, of which probably 3,000 are needei
for garrisons of Hasa and other Provinces. Phi I by considers this estimate
of Ibn Rashid’s resources is doubtless overdrawn, but that it is certain that
Ibn Rashid is stronger in regard to both number and quality of rifles, and
he'considers that force of 15,000 men is minimum required to tackle him
effectively. Ibn Sand states that given adequate assistance in money and
ytrins, he could mobilise that number, and whereas immediate future s most
‘favourable time lor action, lie could if necessary keep them mobilised until
next June, when they would disperse on commencement of Ramazan, lie
would prefer not to mobilise in Qasim, but probably in Sidair, and watch for
favourable opportunity to deliver sudden blow, lie confesses that Hail is
difficult nut to crack owing to unity between townsmen and Beduin, but
considers that once in Hail he could act effectively further afield with
co-operation of his Anaizah connections.
He gauges his requirements for success as follows, namely, 2 siege and
2 held guns with necessary ammunition; 10,000 rifles with ammunition;
and 50,000b per month for period of operation ; in addition he requires
rtain personnel, preferably Arab prisoners of war who served in luikish
„rtillery. If British Artillery officer is deputed he must know Arabic well
and be prepared to live the life of Arabs.
Cunliffe Owen’s estimate (which is being telegraphed separately) is not
very different to above, and they agree that if it is mainly complied vith
project is worth undertaking, and has good prospects of success. It is for
limber authority to decide whether game is worth the candle, and he hopes
that decision will be favourable. ? proposes that guns be sent as
asked for by Cunliffe Owen, together with 7,000 or 8,000 rifles, and that
Ibn Sand be granted an initial sum of 20,000b for purchase of camels, Ac.,
and a monthly grant of 50,000b for three months, on condition of his mam-
tainiim 15,000 men under arms in field, and promise of a present of pO,UUOt.
on capture of Hail, and continuance of monthly allowance if his services are
required further. They would of course remain to see that object is
(? attained) attempted. > id philby trusts
Idle or at
oubt that
posed, and
j uwuust, and, if object in view is still considered
important, he trusts that decision will not be delayed as time is short and
mobilisation cannot start until decision is known. , , , f()11()wg
Cunliffe Owen’s appreciation to Chief of General Staff. Ba^lida 1.
7v
exert himself to utmost,