Coll 30/58 'Persian Gulf. Anglo-Persian Relations. Persian insult to British flag at Basidu' [‎416v] (837/1186)

demand a ceremony at which a Persian naval detachment should rehoist th
British flag and salute it in the presence of British warships. It i s contended
that such a ceremony is essential in order to restore British prestige in the eves
of the Gulf Arabs.
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6 . Mr. Mallet, who in conversation with the Persian Minister for Forei
Affairs has hinted that an offer of visible reparation at Basidu should be ma
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by the Persian Government, has received a strong impression that any further
demands of such a nature would be regarded as an intolerable humiliation by
the Shah, whose ungovernable temper is well known and whose power in his own
country is completely despotic. Mr. Mallet’s considered view is that an attempt
to enforce compliance with such demands (and he would deprecate ’ F
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prolonged crisis in Anglo-Persian relations. This, in the view of the Foreign
Office, would entail the following risks : The steps already taken by the Persian
Government (see paragraph 3 above) would in all probability be cancelled; the
fabric of reconciliation created by the recent exchange of Royal messages
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between the King and the Shah after the settlement of the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company’s dispute would be destroyed; the chances of concluding a treaty for
the settlement of the many outstanding disputes with Persia would be wrecked
(preparations for the resumption of treaty negotiations were recently embarked
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upon with the concurrence of all the departments concerned); the reciprocal
undertaking of His Majesty’s Government and the Persian Government to
respect the status quo in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. pending the conclusion of the
proposed treaty would automatically lapse; a state of acute tension would
supervene in the Gulf; and Persia would almost certainly insist on the
immediate evacuation of the British naval station on the Persian Island of
Heniam (which exists there on tolerance only, having no sound legal basis).
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if His Majesty’s Government are prepared to face the prospect of a serious and
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7. In addition to all this, Mr. Mallet considers, and the Foreign Office agree
with him, that the Persian Government could not in any circumstances be coerced
into compliance with the proposed demand for a public ceremony at Basidu; the
means of coercion at the disposal of His Majesty’s Government are extremely
limited, and the character of the Shah is as stubborn as it is violent.
8 . On the other hand, the suggestion has been put forward that the very
real necessity for restoring the position in the eyes of the Arabs of the Persian
Gulf could be sufficiently met by notifying the principal Arab rulers of the
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. that the Persian Government had tendered their apologies for the
incident, had taken disciplinary action against those responsible, had issued
stringent instructions designed to preclude all possibility of a recurrence of
such incidents in future, and had asked for particulars of other complaints
against the Persian navy, expressing their willingness to investigate them and to
settle all such outstanding cases (most of which closely concern the Arab
sheikhdoms).
9. Mr. Mallet considers that the oral statements already made to him by
the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs would justify a statement to the Arab
rulers to this effect, and considers that, if no additional demands are made, he ,
could obtain from the Persian Government an official apology and a written
recapitulation of the various steps which they have taken in the matter.
10 . It seems to the Foreign Office that the additional advantages to be
gained by the attempt to secure a ceremony at Basidu would be incommensurate
with the risks incurred. They do not underestimate the seriousness of the affront, j ;
and they fully appreciate the need for repairing the damage done to British
prestige in the eyes of the Gulf Arabs. They consider, however, that if ocular
proof is needed, at Basidu itself, of the determination of His Majesty’s Govern
ment to maintain their position and to defend their rights, such proof has already
been provided by the rehoisting of the British flag shortly after the incident and
the instating^ of a British armed guard. It seems likely that an announcement
to the Arab bheikhs on the lines proposed would be sufficient to put a stop to the
rumours to which the incident is reported to have given rise, and to show the
Arabs that His Majesty’s Government have not allowed the matter to pass
unnoticed. Indeed, such action would from the practical point of view appear
likely to be more effective than the mere staging of a small ceremony in a remote