Coll 28/97(1) ‘Persia. Diaries. Tehran Intelligence Summaries.’ [‎320v] (640/807)

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gendarmerie in areas occupied by them. They asked for a detail of numbers
and dispositions proposed. This was presented twelve days ago, but nothing has
been heard from the Russians.
8 . On the strength of verbal assurances from the Russians the Persian
authorities are sending 200 old rifles, whose confiscation will not be serious, for
the rearmament of the gendarmerie on the Tehran-Meshed road.
9. The Persian Government presented an identical note to the British and
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Soviet diplomatic representatives asking for the withdrawal of troops from the
capital. The note alleges that there is no justification for their continued presence
and stresses the difficulties which it creates for the Government. The Russians
regard this note as “ provocation.”
10. In general Persian officials, at least in the capital, show a willing
readiness to co-operate with us.
11 . Reference paragraph 10 of Intelligence Summary No. 21 (current).
Naser Khan has now come in to Shiraz and it is hoped he will make his peace
with the Persian Government.
Persian Civil A ppointments.
12. Governor of Pars : Assadollah Shams Molkara (previously Shahab-ed-
Dowleh).
Persian Forces.
13. Disintegration and demoralisation continue. The Persian General Staff
state that now only about 12,000 men remain of the 1st and 2nd (Tehran) Divisions
and attached troops, whose former strength was nearly 50,000. These divisions
were recruited largely from the northern provinces, particularly Azerbaijan.
Nothing can be done to prevent desertions, as once through the Russian picquets
the men cannot be pursued. For these desertions the General Staff blame the
decrease almost to disappearance of the prestige and authority of the Central
Government, which has demoralised every administration.
14. The General Staff say they have now no reliable troops; that to
, send troops in their present state against rebellious tribes is merely to present
tribesmen with more rifles. They are proposing to organise a special force of
volunteers particularly to deal with the Kurdish situation. They wish to initiate
a reorganisation with better conditions of service, but say that they are unable
to do so until they are given an indication of what will be required and what
will be allowed. In present circumstances they are denied their best recruiting
areas, which are in Russian hands, and no Persian force, however small, can
operate against brigands anywhere near Russian troops.
15. The control and administration of the gendarmerie (amnieh) has now
been transferred from the Ministry of War to the Ministry of the Interior. This
is a reversion to a previous system, which was abandoned in order to secure close
co-operation between the gendarmerie and the army. It is intended that the
gendarmerie in the provinces should in the future be under the direct control of
the Ministry of the Interior, exercised through Governors and not under command
of the military commander. This may result in the army being less ready to give
to the gendarmerie that support which is essential. Signs of rivalry are already
evident.
16. The prospects of the Government being able to find the funds for the
increase of pay promised to the gendarmerie in the current financial year are not
very bright.
17. The following military appointments have been announced :—-
General Shahbakhti (Military Attache’s Personalities No. 262, Foreign
Office No. 151), lately commander of the Khuzestan Division, to be
corps commander to command the Lurestan, Kermanshah and
Kurdistan Divisions.
General Razm Ara, formerly Director of Instruction at the Staff College,
to command the 1 st (Tehran) Division.
General Ghador to be Assistant Director of the Senior Officers’ School.
Brigadier Ali Riazi to be Deputy Chief of the General Staff. This is
a serious, thoughtful officer, a graduate of the French Staff College.
He was a member of the Anglo-Persian Military Mission of 1920
and was liked and respected by the British officers of the mission.
General Moini (Military Attache’s Personalities No. 174, Foreign Office
No. 131) to command forces in Isfahan.