Coll 28/97(1) ‘Persia. Diaries. Tehran Intelligence Summaries.’ [‎342v] (684/807)

•2
threatening to seize the village of Diwan Darreh, where there is a garrison of
about 400 Persian troops, and to advance to Bijar. In present circumstances it
seems unlikely that he will attack Senneh, where there is a garrison of British
troops, since much of the support that he has among Kurds is based on his claim >
that he has British sympathy in his attempt to establish a Persian Kurdistan free
from Persian authority. Consequently, the attack on a patrol of the 6 th Indian 7 f
Division, which resulted in the death of an Indian officer and an Indian soldier,
may have been a mistake. Details have not been received, but it is reported that
the assailants were from the Qalbaghi tribe. The possibility that this attack may
have been put up by persons interested in embroiling British troops with the
Kurds may be deserving of consideration.
7. I he Persian military authorities are not anxious to go to war with the
Kurds, and the Government is genuinely desirous of reaching a peaceful settle
ment. A commission has been approved to investigate Kurdish grievances and
to consider the restitution of lands of which the owners have been legally
dispossessed. It is probable that the Government would also agree to appoint
Kurdish Governors, but they must be of their own choosing, and there must be the
outward semblance at least of Persian Government authority.
8 . The situation is further complicated by Russian dealings with Kurdish
chiefs (see Summary No. 28, paragraph 24). There is no indication that these
have as their object the restoration of Government authority among the Kurds.
Rather are they interpreted as evidence of Russian encouragement of Kurdish
aspirations.
9. His Majesty’s Minister has authorised His Majesty’s Consul at
Kermanshah to give the maximum publicity to a statement that British policy
does not support Mohamed Rashid, but is to encourage the Persian Government
to redress legitimate grievances while restoring their own authority in
Kurdistan.
Persian Army.
10 The following arms have been lost by the Persian forces since the
invasion :—
Rifles : Over 100,000.
L. M.G. : Nearly 2 . 000 .
M. M.G. : About 600.
Mtn. guns : 60.
Field guns 105 : 72.
The guns are presumably in the hands of British and Russian forces, but a
considerable number of the rifles and machine guns must be in the hands of tribes
and brigands. This is a cause of great anxiety in the Persian General Staff'
regarding internal security in the spring.
Russian Affairs.
11 . The Soviet military authorities have agreed to release the Persian
officers and n.c.os. whom they have been holding as prisoners. Twenty-nine
officers and a number of n.c.os. have already been released. The total number of
officer prisoners is believed to be about 250.
12 . The Soviet military authorities have demanded a considerable reduction
in the number of armed men police and gendarmerie—which they had previously
agreed to allow in the Russian-occupied zone. For example, the number of armed
police in Tabiiz is to be reduced from 400 to 205 men, and the gendarmerie in
Azerbaijan from 4,000 to 1,500.
13. I he Russians have exported from Pahlevi large quantities of iron m
various forms which was alleged to belong to German firms. The amount is said
to exceed 1,000 tons.
Yugoslav Interests.
14. A fui thei party of forty Jugoslavs is to leave Tehran on the
16th December to join the Yugoslav forces jn Mideast (see Summary No. 28.
paragraph 36).
Tehran, December 15, 1941.