File 522/1922 Pt 4 'Persian Gulf: Bahrein: Internal' [‎112r] (228/616)

or force ourselves on the principality in the face of the world, against the wishes of
its rulers. The fact that under treaty the ruler is not allowed to correspond with
foreign powers has not prevented him from so doing in the past, and would not do
so in the future.
I 8 ' J? i " 1849 ’ we d id no* take over Bahrain when it was offered
to us by Shaikh Mohammed because of the commitments it would give us in adminis
tration and defence. To-day our position in the Islands is accepted by the 4rabs
and we have accepted the commitments in administration, and we should have
equal! y to accept the commitments for defence if Bahrain were threatened Indeed
I am separately suggesting it as a Naval base and the headquarters of our squadron
in the Persian Gult. ^
59. The objections to a Protectorate are purely political, they are no longer
admimstrati.e. But Shaikh Hamad knows that he cannot stand without us and
indeed I would say that notwithstanding his personal outlook, he is content to keep
us there for t nat reason. His state of mind is a mixed one to be swaved either wav
by the course of events. At present, though turning towards Ibn Saud, in his per-
sonal feelings, he looks towards us and has no desire for the rigid strictness of Wahabi
6°. I would suggest then that Shaikh Hamad should be induced to approach us
saying that lie fears the political situation, and would be glad if we would extend
to mm the protection which was refused to his predecessor in 1849.
With the consolidation of our position we could afford to cut down the British
staff to one man, and insist that Shaikh Hamad should make all the show of ruler-
force ^ m an Indian State ’ since our position would be unassailable except by
61. The Protectorate thus concluded need not be proclaimed for the moment,
anH 18 n ° . Slre ^ 5 ^ would legalise and consolidate a position which is loose
uncertam. I cannot, personally, face with equanimity a future based on the
presen circumstances of world politics, especially of Eastern politics, and the con-
ions un er which we are now tolerated in Bahrain, conditions which with the
fnm4u Ce i? n t ''^ a i ia ki power, might, in place of a willing subordination, become a
advancing II on no with a hostile people in open sympathy with an
ennnff i^ e - ar - e 1( f in S our portion in the Northern coast of the Gulf; we shall
w-imi \ 0S fr ^ ln the Southern if we allow Bin Saud to consolidate his power on the
"hole Southern littoral.
A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty’s Minister, Tehran.
toC531pD
1 17-9-27—GIPS.