'File 11/46 Publicity in the Persian Gulf' [‎63r] (125/314)

3 E C R a X
NOTE OF A TALK BY THE P.I.O. JERUSALEM
(UR. CHRISTOPHER HOUSE) ON BRITISH PUBLICITY
IN PALESTINE, AND ITS RELATION TO OTHER
FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT.
GIVEN ON MARCH 13, 1945.
The status of the Public Information Officer of Palestine
probably differs slightly from that of the Ministry of Inform
ation officers in other overseas posts. The Public Inform
ation Office is an integral part of the Secretarial of the
Palestine Government. Palestine has had a Public Information
Officer since 1936, previously to that there had been a Press
Officer for some years. Early in 1939 an officer was appoint
ed as assistant to the P.I.O. for the specific purpose of
counter-propaganda. The new appaintraent was made as the result
of a meeting at which the War Office and Foreign Office, as
well as the Colonial Office, were represented. I believe
it was probably the first case of an officer being appointed
to a British administration overseas, during the H sub war M
period, for the specific purpose of counter propaganda.
The aim of the activities then set on foot by the Palestine
Government in co-operation with the military authorities of
Palestine may be summarised as an attempt to wean the Arab
population away from the Axis. The large majority of politi
cally conscious Arabs were at that time pro-Axis$ they looked
upon Britain as the sponsor of Jewish immigration, and there
fore their enemy. I should like to emphasise that the Arab
conflict with the Jews is not basically religious, though that
may sometimes appear as an irritant; indigenous communities
such as the Yemanite Jews have always been tolerated by the
Arabs. The objection is to the penetration of the country by
European immigrants, an objection based on fear - fear of the
European Jews 1 superior skill, higher culture, and greater
power of economic organisation. Fear drives to desperation;
and it was desperation, allied to poverty and under-employment,
that drove the Arabs into the hills. It was part of our news
policy to represent the many Arabs who took active part in the
rebellion at that time as dandlts. Some of them probably were,
but a good proportion were intellectuals, inspired * by a genuine
if misguided, Idealism.
On the outbreak of war with Germany in 1939, the rebellion
was called off, possibly on an order from Baghdad. The reasons
for such an order were probably that the Mufti*s advisers told
him, first, that the rebellion had been militarily crushed, as
it certainly had been; second, that the British Government^®*
*k4e d4££4euj White Paper policy was at least in part a satis
faction of the Arab claims; and lastly, that to declare loyalty
to the British Government at this difficult time might be a wise
move and store up Arab credit for the future. Whatever the
exact reasons, the rebellion was called off; but this did not
mean a complete change of heart on the part of the Arab leaders,
who remained exceedingly reserved.
Publicity*s job was to convert an audience not only hostile
but ■ unwilling to listen. All information from British sources
was suspect, so that much resistance had to be broken down before
propaganda could take any effect. I think we may have started
with the idea that propaganda was something you manufactured,
and handed out, and then watched it take effect. In practice
/It was.....