Coll 6/8(1) 'Printed Series: 1929 to 1938.' [‎38v] (81/1062)

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i . . be made an instrument for Italian
also warned the mufti no o e wa nted the whole “ bundle of Arab
intrigues. He went on to say th g Govern He was not
states to be on good terms with H question being considered,
thinking of Palestine for the mon . h t woald be satisfactory to
and he trusted that a solution of Palestine, and to the Arabs in
His Majesty’s Government to « which threatened the Arab world
general. No, he was t i ^ fe
in two places, the Yeme , ^ ^ ^ ^ £ erme nt. The whole country
3. First the Yemen. The , while the Imam sa id yes to every-
was against the heir apparent. ^ gong of the Imam came 0 n the pil-
one, but did nothing. Wh® 11 * , t0 the King about the situation in
grimage recently, Sayyid Hus ■ P h a revolt i n the Yemen,
the Yemen and asked for his advice. H the Italians , According
what would be the att ‘ tu f b ° Sa ^new it to be true—the whole population
to Sayyid Husam-and Ibn Saud^knew^ Mini8 t e r, Kaghib, a Turk
without exception hated A < removal of Raghib, but he
who is in Italian ^T^^tVad sent Ihe Imam a written protest (here
was protected by Ahmad 2 ithout e ff ec t. If they were free they would
the King gave ns a copy), t> ppk an d Ahmad, and the Imam too if he
revolt and sweep away both Kaghib ana Anmau,
opposed this popular movement. . , , ...
4 To this enuuirv from Sayyid Husain, Ibn Sand said he had repUed
that, as for himself, hJproposed to observe Yd‘withdrawn 0^6“^ hi
and non-intervention in Yemen affairs. He had withdrawn once wiiemhe
might have occupied the Yemen, and he did not propose to reverse that
policy. If there should be trouble in the Yemen, the most he could do would
be to consult other Arab countries if asked by both sides to try to make peace,
and to see what could be done to give effect to the request. As to Great
Britain and Italy, Ibn Saud had told Husain about the Home understanding
of 1927, and had said that both the British and the Italians had assured him.
that it was their firm desire that the independence of the Yemen should be
maintained. In conclusion, Ibn Saud declared vehemently that there must
be an outbreak in the Yemen—perhaps before the death of the Imam. In
that event, what would the Italians do and what would be the attitude ot
His Majesty’s Government ?
5. Mr. Rendel replied that His Majesty’s Government fully appreciated
the dangers of the situation in the Yemen. There was no doubt that the
Italians had been, and still are, intriguing actively in that country and would
be very ready to fish in the waters they had helped to trouble. But while
the internal situation was perhaps more dangerous than it had been, he was
inclined, for the following reasons and speaking purely personally, to doubt
whether the Italian danger was now quite as acute as it had been a year ago..
In the Rome understanding of 1927 His Majesty’s Government had made it
quite clear, and the Italians had formally recognised, that His Majesty’s
Government regarded it as “ a vital imperial interest that no European Power
should establish itself on the Arabian shore of the Red Sea. ” {At this point
Sir Reader Bullard gave King Ibn Saud, for convenience of reference, a copy
of an Arabic translation of the relevent text, w T hich had already been com
municated to His Majesty by Sir Andrew Ray an.) There was, of course,
no reason to trust any Italian promises as such, but if was obvious that, in
T- iew of the terms of the Rome understanding, any attempt by Italy to estab
lish herself in the T emen would be a direct challenge to His Majesty’s Gov
ernment. No doubt Italian hot heads, possibly Italian local officials, cherish-
e esigns on the Y emen. But Italian policy ’would be directed from Rome,
and present mdicatons suggested that for European reasons, and in view of
^R 1S ?r- re ^ I ^ ai ^ e ? t ’ was not now anxious to embark on any conflict
.• 18 jhi es y Government, but was rather seeking to establish better
Thn Wl E Tu lf thlS Vi ? w should P rove mistaken, he did not think King
p!'T lb f rl0 " al y disturbed by ItaUan activities in the Yemen,
alv develn™S In Were closel y Parallel, and it was difficult to see how
threaten British inTereL ^ COuld fail
Ibn Sand wrmiri • " StS ’ 80 t ^ t ^ le P r °P a Pffity was that, m any such event,
ibn baud would, m any case, find Great Britain at his side. At a later
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