Coll 6/8(1) 'Printed Series: 1929 to 1938.' [‎249r] (502/1062)

85
for the Emir Eeisul the theoretical Minister, did not, so far as I knew,
concern himself with foreign business. He (Fuad) was therefore in th^
position of a responsible statesman. I myself was a civil servant. I
could, and did, advise my Government on particular questions, but nor
mally a diplomatic representative did not shape maior policy I could
hardly, therefore enter into a contract, as it were, to pursue a given set
of objects, though I could, and would, collaborate with him.
4. I had promised to give Fuad Bey some observations on his statement
of the 14th June. 1 began with his historical retrospect recognising that
all through Ibn Sand had been a friend. Fuad Bey knew more, I said,
than T did about the details of the recent history of Arabia. I suggested'
however, that he had not paid sufficient attention to the fact that thTevents
to which he had adverted were all parts of a difficult process of readjust
ment following on the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The position
after the Great War was that there were certain parts of Arabia in which
we had taken on definite responsibilities and others in which we had a less
direct interest, two being areas ruled over by two Sovereigns who were both
our friends. We were indebted to King Hussein as well as to Ibn Sand.
We had sought to work for a stable Arabia and to compose differences. Ibn
Sand had, so far as territory was concerned, come best out of the whole
process, not thanks to ns but to himself. Fuad had spoken of encirclement.
It appeared to me that we had been on the edge of the circle first and that
Ibn Sand had expanded until he filled it. For me, I said, history began
with the Treaty of Jedda in 1927, subject to there being a pre-history
dating from 1925. Owing to our special responsibilities in Iraq and Trans
jordan we had negotiated the Bahra and Hadda Agreements at a time when
Ibn Sand had not yet completed his conquest of the Hejaz.
5. Fuad Bey suggested that all would have been well had we kept the
adjoining countries under our own control and had not introduced into
them as rulers the King’s enemies. I said that the first alternative was
out of the question, because responsible people in Great Britain and British
pubblic opinion did not want enlarged commitments but reduced commit
ments in the East, and because there were nationalist sentiments to be
reckoned with in the countries themselves. Those sentiments had been
strong in Iraq and they existed in Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan , though the position of that
territory was different and its evolution was less complete. I demurred
strongly to the idea that there could be no real friendship between us and
those countries, because we retained a special position, which in l 1 e
Iraq would be reduced to an absolute minimum when the treaty of 1930
became operative. We wished to be, and thought we could be, fnends^with
everybody. Onr ideal was to see settled States in Arabia m friendship
with us and with each other. A great measure of equilibrium had been
achieved There were States with definite frontiers even though the
Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan frontier, for instance, was m one part still a theatre ot
difficulty and in another the subject of an outstanding question as he had
reminded me when speaking of Aqaba and Maan. a neve
sion to deal with that particular question and did not ™ ean ft
It had been in abeyance since 1927 when we had st at e .d a position whmh
the King had not accepted; but he had agreed to a an J
riiwadi, and all I could see for it if there were an ^Bev
was that the status quo and the modus vwendi shouid continue. (Fuad Hey
reminded me that he had himself disclaimed any ^ | '" was
pressing the question at the present time.) e q direction save
such that the King had come into contact with us ' n . e I® r y
one. Our desire for stability was such that we wis us yVe
his frontiers, even 0I ? * e . o y e htd^ever spoken about it, but on
were not concerned with the Yemen ami i Kp+wopu Ibn Saud and
iD r.
SSS'rwlrfthetol fcTlhbgTLtad enumerated. 1 mtpmi **

Coll 6/8(1) 'Printed Series: 1929 to 1938.' [‎249r] (502/1062)

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Coll 6/8(1) 'Printed Series: 1929 to 1938.' [‎249r] (502/1062)

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