PZ 5749/39(1) 'Propaganda: Articles forwarded to Persian Gulf, Kabul & Katmandu for dissemination' [‎226r] (451/715)

success would have procured for him with his own people. But it
would only have been to start again once the world had recovered
from the shock, and even his own people were beginning to be tired
of these repeated crises. Millions of Germans had begun to long for
a more peaceful existence. Guns instead of butter were becoming
jnore and more unpopular except with the younger generation, and
Tlitler may well have wondered what might happen to his Nazi
revolution if its momentum were allowed to stop. Moreover the
financial and economic position of Germany was such that things
could scarcely continue as they were without some form of explosion,
internal or external. Of the two alternatives the most attractive
from the point of view of his growing personal ambitions, and those
of the clique which was nearest to him, was war.
73. It is scarcely credible that he would have acted as he did
if bloody war, rather than a bloodless victory, had not seemed the
fairer prospect for him. He had always meant to teach the Poles
a lesson for what he regarded as their base ingratitude in refusing
the “generous” demands which he had made to them in March.
His only manoeuvres since that date were with the object of creating
circumstances favourable to his plans or of inducing Britain and
France to abandon their Polish ally and to leave him a free hand
in Central and Eastern Europe.
74. To this end, encouraged by Herr von Bibbentrop, who
apparently advised him up to the last moment that Britain would
not fight, he worked unceasingly. In the course of one of the five
interviews which I had with him during those last few days, I
remarked to him that it was he who was ungenerous to the Poles,
in view of the advantages which his treaty of 1934 with Pilsudski
had brought him. Herr Hitler denied that that treaty had ever
been of any benefit to Germany and asserted that it had merely been
unpopular with the Germans. It was a remark which was typical
of Herr Hitler’s capacity to ignore everything which he might have
said, promised or done in the past as soon as it had become contrary
to views for the present or the future.
75. One of Herr Hitler’s greatest drawbacks is that, except, for
two official visits to Italy, he has never travelled abroad. For his
knowledge of British mentality he consequently relied on Herr von
Ribbentrop as an ex-Ambassador to Britain, who spoke both French
and English, and who had spent some years in Canada, and whom
he regarded as a man of the world. If report be true Herr von
Ribbentrop gave him consistently false counsels in regard to England,
while his successes in other spheres induced Herr Hitler to regard
him more and more as a second Bismarck, a conviction which
Herr von Ribbentrop probably shared to the full.
76. Even the most absolute Dictator is susceptible to the
influence of his surroundings. Nevertheless Herr Hitler’s decisions,
his calculations, and his opportunisms were his own. As Field-