Correspondence and Newspaper Cuttings about Persia and the Persian Gulf [‎86v] (163/179)

154
THE TIMES OF INDIA.
[August 13, 1898.
THE NEW VICEROY.
HIS VIEWS ON ASIATIC PROBLEMS.
Opinions on the Frontier Policy.
The Hon. George Nathaniel Cnrzon, M. P.,
whose selection as the next Viceroy of India
has been announced, is the eldest son or
the Rev. Alfred, Baron Scarsdale, a country
clergyman. He was educated at Eton, and
at Balliol College, Oxford, where he formed
one of the band of brilliant students attracted by
the powerful personality of Dr. Jowett. He
made his mark as a speaker at the Union Society s
debates, and afterwards as president of that
famous Club. He graduated in 1884, took his
M..Y in 1887, and was elected to a fellow
ship of All Souls. At the general election
of 1 1886 he was returned for the Stockport
Division of Lancashire, which he has continued
to represent in Parliament. But it was ever
to the East that his eyes were turned, and
about 1884 he planned a great scheme of travel in
the Orient to examine on the spot the different
aspects of the Asiatic problem. The greater
portion of the succeeding years, up to 1892, were
devoted to this self-imposed task. By travel and
diligent study he has become one of the first
living authorities on Eastern topics, and his ex
periences and opinions have been embodied in
volumes which arc standard works upon the sub
jects with which they treat. In 1889 he published
“ Russia in Central Asia,” an exhaustive analysis of
the Central Asian problem, and of Anglo-Russian
relations, especially in reference to India ; in
1892 his monumental work on Persia ; and in 1894
“ Problems of the Par East—Japan Korea, and
China”—which was revised and a chapter added
on the Japanese and Chinese War two years later.
He also published last year, under the auspices of
th ■ Royal Geographical Society (whoso gold
medal has been awarded to him), a valuable
monograph on the Pamirs and the sources of
the Oxus, embodying the results of his own explo
rations. What he had done for Russia in Central
Asia, and Persia, the countries upon the west of
India, Mr. Curzon hoped to do for Siam and the
French possessions in Indo-China. All his travels
impressed him with the surpassing importance of
the position of India in Asia, which he
expressed in his own words thus “ As I
proceed with this undertaking, the true
fulcrum of Asiatic dominion seems to me to
increasingly lie in the Empire of Hindustan,
Th-J secret of the mastery of the world is, if
only they knew it, in the possession of the British
people.” He qualified for this further work by
travel in these little known countries, and
a few detached newspaper and magazine articles
from his pen were regarded as the precursors to
another solid volume, but the pressure of public
work, and the etiquette of the position he has
held in the present Ministry, have delayed the
completion of this project. Similarly, in 1894,
Mr. Curzon traversed the North-Western Frontier
of India, visiting Chitral and the Ameer, and
wrote a valuable series of letters for the Times.
His published works are so full and detailed that
they form a complete index to his views upon
every vital problem of the Far East.
In 1891-92 Mr. Curzon held office as Under
Secretary of State for India, his chief being
Viscount Cross. In 1895, on the resumption
of office by Lord Salisbury, he became Under
secretary for Foreign Affairs, which office he
has held over since. He did not have a seat in
the Cabinet on either occasion. In 1895 he
married Miss Leiter, daughter of Mr. L. Z.
Loiter, of Washington. He was born in 1859.
HIS VIEWS ON THE FRONTIER
QUESTION.
Mr. Curzon’s views upon the Frontier Ques
tion have been clearly indicated in his published
writings, but they were enunciated with un
compromising clearness and vigour in the debate
upon the policy of the Government in the
House of Commons on February 15th of this
year. The debate turned largely upon the
occupation of Chitral, and in defence of the
decision to remain in occupation he said
There was a remark in one of the speeches of the late
Secretary of State for India in the vacation to the effect
that the natural boundary of India is determined by the
stupendous range of mountains called the Hindukush upon
the north. I quite agree that that is a barrier which no
sane man has proposed or would propose to go beyond.
But if you have a wall round your house, and if there is one
point at which, owin" to the conditions of the ground,
that wall can be easily pierced or broken, and if the
occu pant of the house shows no desire to defend this parti
cular point, no one would call him a strategist, and few
people would call him sane. Yet that is exactly the situa
tion in regard to Chitral. The great strategical importance
of that place is due to tho fact that in this great range of
mountains there are only two easy passes—one at a dis-
tanco of 40 miles and the other 130/miles from the fort of
Chitral ; and from Chitral itself tfiere are two compara
tively easy routes, not over passes of Alpine altitudes, a
the right hon. gentleman supposes, because the highest
elevation is only 7,000ft. One of these routes conducts
into the heart of Afghanistan, which we have pledged our
selves to defend, and the other into British India. It is
contended that no invading force would be foolish enough
to run into such a death-trap as the Chitral Valley. But
it was not found to be a death-trap during tho advance of
Sir Hubert Low and General Gatacre marching from the
soutli, and why should it be one for a force marching from
the north ? But, after all, it is not the appearance of an
invading army that is feared, but the establishment of
hostile influence in the State of Chitral, which could only
haw* a demoralizing effect unou. the whole of the frontier.
Baying claimed that tliese dangers were not
obviated by the Pamir agreement of 1895, he
went on to defend Russia from the charge of
rnala jides, and to point out how circumstances
might be too strong for her.
You cannot always be certain of frontier officers, either
Russian or British. Already on two occasions Russian
officers have crossed that frontier, and in one case they
made a secret treaty with a chief under British protection.
The House also cannot forget the fact that, although Lord
Granville concluded in 1873 a formal agreement with
Russia by which the northern boundary of Afghanistan
was fixed, and under which she undertook that that country
should be for ever outside the sphere of her influence and
action, yet at the same time, when circumstances reached a
troubled state in Europe, that agreement did not prevent a
Russian Embassy from being sent to Cabul and a secret
treaty being concluded with the Ameer land a secret corre
spondence taking place, which was found by Lord Roberts.
In the same way, I hold that with however loyalty Russia
desires to keep her agreements on that frontier, it would
have been almost impossible for her to do so if we had left
a gap on our side. If you agree upon a frontier with a great
Power, to cross which is war, one party to the agreement
cannot run away from that frontier. Both parties must
occupy, or at least exert, their influence up to that boundary,
Russia has done so on her part. She has planted her soldier.-
right up to the Oxus, and wo were equally bound to do the
same. There, as elsewhere, nature abhors a vacuum. These
States, of which Chitral is one, are so small that they
not stand by themselves.
THE LAWRENCE POLICY DEAD.
Turning then to the larger issues revolving
round the question of frontier policy, and the
relations of English parties to it, Mr. Curzon
proceeded to tear to pieces the arguments of the
advocates of the Lawrence policy :—
I agree that that policy was based on righteous
principles, just as it was expressed in admirable form.
It was a policy that was well adapted to its day. But
right hon. gentlemen opposite are mistaken if they hold
that it is applicable now. In the course of the recess
rhetoric the leader of the Opposition said at Kirkcaldy
that the sound opinion of Lord Lawrence was that we
should stand behind the mountains and not embarrass
ourselves with conflicts with the tribes by which they are
inhabited. That, no doubt, is an excellent phrase for a
speech, but, unfortunately, it does not represent facts.
Tho Lawrence policy is really dead, and tho death-blow
has been dealt by both parties in this house, and especially
by those who sit on the other side. We are invited by
the leader of the Opposition to stand behind the mountains.
Well, it was Mr. Gladstone who first took us beyond the'
mountains. We are also told not to entangle ourselves
with the tribes. Mr. Gladstone was the first statesman
to make engagements with the tribes Along the whole -
of this prodigious line of frontier Mr. Gladstone’s Govern
ment adopted a policy which, whether it was good or bad—
and, in my humble judgment, it was good—was not, at
any rate, the Lawrence policy, and they have committed
us by that policy to obligations of honour and good faith
by which every subsequent Government has been held,
and which no future Government, whether drawn from
that bench or this, will ever repudiate. That, I take it,
is what Lord Kimberley meant wb^u he stated the other
day that the whole circumstance of the case had been
;ely changed of late years, that we had deliberately
adopted a more forward policy, and that the Libera l
Government was responsible for that.
IT CANNOT BE REVIVED.
Mr. Curzon afterwards showed why, in his
opinion, the Lawrence policy cannot be revived.
There are two other reasons why the Lawrence policy cai
never be revived. The first of these is the great chang
which has taken place in the external position, which is div
to the systematic, and I think also the legitimate, advance of
Russia. When Lord Lawrence wrote his famous memoran
dum in 18G8 Russia had only just subdued the Caucasus :
she had not advanced to Tashkent or established her admi
nistration in Turkestan. But now her flag is flying on the
banks of the Oxus. Her frontiers are not thousands of
miles away, but are contiguous to those of Afghanistan,
which we are bound to defend as if they were the frontiers
of Great Britain. Under those circumstances it is vain and
childish to argue that those old formulas which prevailed
30 years ago are adequate to the new situation. The Law
rence policy was designed to protect India from a danger
which was at the time separated from her by thousands
of miles. It is not quite suited to a situation wher
forces of a great European Power are at many scores of
points literally at your gates. But there is another reason
why the Lawrence policy can never be revived. It is tho
effect which would be produced in India itself. It is dnsy
for the right hon. gentleman opposite to speak of onr sitting
down on the banks of the Indus river, and there await the
enemy that was marching to destruction. But what Goyqra-
ment would dare to do it.-" What Government will guarantee
the peaceful acquiescence of India behind it in such a
situation. If the Lawrence policy were carried out it would
mean that we might at once blow up the tunnels we have
constructed ; tear up again the railway to Quetta, give up the
whole life work of Sir Robert Sandeman. If we were to
adopt such a policy all I can say is that our faces would be
black before all Asia and all India. The Sikhs and Gurkhas
whom we have attracted to our ranks, and I hope will never
cease to do so ; the peaceful millions of India who pursue
their silent industries in reliance on the protection we
guarantee them, would turn from us, if they did not turn
on us, in contempt for our cowardice. And I do not hesi
tate to say that we should never have the opportunity of
testing this wonderful revival of the Lawrence policy which
is to save us from attack from without, because long before
such an attack was possible we should have lost India from
within. To sum up what I have said in a single sentence,
I will quote the words of Warren Hastings, who said :—“To
stand still in India is danger, to recede is ruin.”
THE POLICY WHICH OUGHT TO BE
PURSUED.
After expressing his entire sympathy with
those who spoke about the independence of the
tribes, and protesting against the continued
occupation of their territory, Mr. Curzon
laid down the lines of the policy he thought
ought to be pursued :—
There is no one #here or on the other side of the House
who has the slightest desire to destroy the independence
annex the territory of any one of those tribes. We do not
even desire to interfere with their customs, their
prejudices, their religion, or even with their internal
administration. But there our agreement with the other
side ends ; and we are at once confronted with the question
—“ Can we avoid the tribes altogether ? ” No, we cannot, for
several reasons, the first being that however anxious we may
be to let them alone, they will not let us alone. Many of
those tribes are composed of men of a wild and lawless
character, devoted to predatory habits. They insist upon
raiding our territory and upon carrying off the flocks and
herds of the people under our control lam not surpris
ed that we hear no more about the policy of punitive expedi
tions. Hon. gentlemen know that when these outrages take
place an expedition is organized. It is sent across the fron
tier as soon as possible, and burns a certain number of
villages and towns, destroys a certain number of crops
creates a trail of misery as it advances, and retreats, leaving
the smouldering embers-of resentment and revenge
- into British territory. That, I venture to say
' to the external frontier of which I have been speaking, or,
at any rate, to take up a forward, although a less forward,
position on the line of Cabul, Ghazni, and Kandahar, You
must be therefore certain of tho main passes into that
country; but if you leave the tribes absolutely alone,
my hon. friend opposite would have you do, you can have
no such certainty, and you may find that at the vei
moment when you are called upon to defend the ou:<
frontier you may be engaged in hostilities on the inner
frontier. We must, therefore, enter into some relations
with the tribes. What form shonld they take ? Surely
it ought to be possible—and my noble friend has found it
possible—to construct a formula with which all will agree—
that those relations should involve the minimum of inter
ference with the independence or lands of the tribesmen.
But three things are essential. We must have the means
of communication by the main roads and passes. We must
have the control of the Gomal and Khyber Passes, the Chitral
road, and the main pass over the Hindukush. Secondly,
we must have control over the foreign relations of the
tribes. They must not be at liberty to side with our
enemies. Thirdly, we must have some assurance as to
their good conduct, in return for which we are always
ready to pay them handsome subsidies. In my own
judgment—and in this matter I speak for myself only—
these relations with the tribes can only be successfully
maintained by entering into confidential relations with
the tribes. We have heard a good deal of Sir R. Sandeman
in the course of these debate-:. I have had the advantage
or the acquaintance and a long correspondence with that
eminent man, and I can say. having seen his policy at
On the spot, it was not a policy of laissez fairc, but, c
contrary, it was a policy of mingled courage and concilia
tion, and, above all, a policy of confidence and going
about amongst and acquiring the friendship of the tribes.
THE FASCINATION OF INDIA.
Although Mr. Curzon’s writings on India have
been principally confined to dealing with the
frontier question and India in relation to
Central Asian politics he has, in the opening
chapter of his “ Problems of the Far East,”
given vivid expression to the fascination
Hindustan has exercised over his imagination.
After drawing attention to the contrasts
between Western Asia “ in the unyielding and
pitiless clutch of Islam, which opposes a
Cyclopean wall of resistance to innovation or
reform,” and Eastern Asia, where we encounter
only the wild faith of the Indian Prince, more
or less:overlaid with superstition and idolatry
or sapped by scepticism and decay, he says :—
_ Midway between the two flanks of the continent whose
rival differences I have sketched lies India, sharing the
features, both good and evil, of both. She has wide waterless
and untilled plains ; but she also has throbbing hives of
human labour and life. Her surface is marked both by
mighty rivers and by Saharas of sand. Among her peoples
are Mahomedans of both schools, mixed up with diverse
and pagan creeds. Of her races some have always subsisted
by the sword alone, to others the ploughshare is the only
known implement of iron. She combines the rigours of
eternal snow with tho luxuriant flame of the tropics. With
in her borders may be studied every one of the problems
with which the rest of Asia challenges our concern. But
her central and commanding position is nowhere better
seen than in the political influence which she exercises
the destinies of her neighbours near and far and the extent
to which their fortunes revolve upon an Indian axis. The
independence of Afghanistan, the continued national exist
ence of Persia, the maintenance of Turkish rule at Baghdad
and all dependent upon Calcutta. Nay, the radiat
ing circle of her influence overlaps the adjoining continent
and affects alike the fate of the Bosphorus and
destinies _ of Egypt. Nor is the effect less
remarkable if examined upon the eastern side, to
hich in this book I am about to invite attention.
- i 6 from jealousy of India, and to impair the position
hich India gives to Great Britain in the Far East, that
ranee has again embarked upon an Asiatic career and is
advancing from the smith-east with steps that faithfully
correspond with those of Russia upon the North-West.
The heritage of the Indian Empire has within the last ten
years made us the land-neighbours of China and has mul-
tiplied three-fold the area of our diplomacy at Pekin< r .
Even the fortunes of remote Korea are in a manner bound
up with the politics of Hindustan, seeing that it is by the
same foe that,in the last resort, both are threatened, and that
the tactics which aim at the appropriation of the smaller
unit have as their ulterior objective the detriment of the
greater. Such and so supreme is the position enjoyed in
the Asian continent by the Empire of the Kaiser-i-Hind.
Towards her, or into her orbit a centripetal force which
none appears able to resist, draws every wandering star,
Just as it may be said that the Eastern Question in Europe
turns upon the dismemberment of Turkey, so the Eastern
4 - Asia turns upon the continued soUdarity of
THE LINKING OF RUSSIAN AND
INDIAN RAILWAYS.
The consideration of tho extension of tho
Russian system to the Afghan frontier naturally
le,ads to the discussion of the much-debated
subject of the linking of the Russian and Indian
systems. As to the policy of this Mr. Curzon
holds no halting opinion :—
I come now to the question of the suggested extensi™ ct
tJ,e Ime through the heart of Afghanistan, and its i lmclio °,
wtth the Indian railway system at Kandahar. General
Annenkoff has both m print and in reported interne,™
indulged in the most rainbow-hued anticipations of such m'
amalgamation He has talked about Englishmen travelling
from London to India in nine days ™ the Caspian and
Herat , and, though he seems to have been struck by the
improbability that such a line passing through Rnsskii
territory could be utilised by British troops, he has express
ed the ingenuous opinion that it might certainly be used bv
British merchants, while an exemption might even be made
in favour of British Officers. The physical obstacles to
such a through line are nil. . . . When we return to
the political aspect of the question we are in a verv
different atmosphere. After all, the proposed amalgama
tion must involve two consenting parties ; and if the Russian
Government were to favour the idea, which is so contrary
to traditional Muscovite policy as to be extremely unlikelv
the consent of Downing Street, of the British House of
Commons, and in the last resort, of the British people
would still have to be obtained. I devoutly hope that
not one of the three would for a moment entertain an idea
so speculative in its inception, so problematical in its issues
so perilous in the lateral contingencies to which it mHit
give birth. I question if even from a fiscal point of view
England would reap the slightest advantage from the
alleged new outlet to her Indian trade; for this would
speedily be stifled by the merciless prohibitory tariffs of
Russia, which already have all but ousted English caravan-
borne goods from the markets of Central Asia, and have
seriously handicapped the export of Indian native produce and
manufactures. On the other hand, Russian merchandise
unimpeded by hostile duties, would descend in an avalanche
upon the markets of Afghanistan, Beluchistan, and the
Indian border ; it would flood the towns of Seistan and
Southern Persia ; and England would find that she had
stupidly handed over the keys of her commercial monopoly
to her only formidable rival. But supposing these views to
be exaggerated or mistaken assuming’ commercial profit to
Great Britain resulting from junction of railways, and
estimating that profit at the maximum, it would yet be
dearly purchased at the cost of national insecurity, of
lowered prestige, and of perpetual danger. The prolonga
tion of the Russian railway through Afghanistan—for if° it
were prolonged,! t is to be feared that as far as Kandahar
it would be the work of Russian capital and Russian hands
—would be regarded throughout the East as a crowning
blow to British prestige already imperilled by a long course
of pocketted affronts and diplomatic reverses. It would
imply the consolidation of Russian dominion right up to
behind
and p;
is not, in most cases, a successful' policy. What ^ ^
faults ? In tho first place, the blow is often struck too late
secondly, you do not always succeed in punishing the tru
culprits, and a good deal of suffering falls on the innocent
thirdly, by retiring you create an impression of weakness
and encourage a repetition of the same offence. Take the
numerous .expeditions 'against the Waziris and the Black
Mountain expeditions, of which there were two or three in
the space of ten years. There is another reason why you
cannot severely leave these tribes alone, and that is that we
are bound, in the first place, by obligations to the tribes
themselves ; and, (secondly, by obligations to defend the
strategical frontier beyond. As to the obligations to the
tribes, Mr. Gladstone was the first to take one of the
tribes under ouriprotection after the Afghan War. He con
cluded arrangements with the Khyber Afridis We have
mice, under Sir K. Sandeman, made arrangements with the
Beluch tribes. We have on the north made similar arramre-
ments with the tribes on the Chitral road, and with the
whole of the tribes inhabiting Waziristan in the neighbour
hood of tho Hindukush. Hon. gentlemen opposite are
very properly sensitive on the point of honour. I ask—
Would they wish us to break the solemn undertakings into
which we havfe entered with all these tribes ?
THE THREE THINGS ESSENTIAL.
After a brief allusion to our relations with the
Ameer, Mr. Curzon dealt with the manner in
which these obligations should be carried out :
. R these obligations exist, and if this is their nature, it
is clear that we may have at some time or other to advance
Europe
Question m.i u um vl
Hindustan. In what relation to that problem^stand the
countries and people of the Far East, what is their present
political condition, and in what way they are engaged in
constructing the history or reconstructing the maps of the
future, it is my object in these pages lo determine.
THE FUTURE OF ASIA.
Mr Curzon s analysis of the Central Asian
Froblem derives a greatly enhanced value from
the broad and dispassionate standpoint from
which he views the advance of Russia eastward,
Ills own mental attitude towards Oriental poli
tics he described in the preface to a later work
when he said :—
I can honestly disclaim, on the several occasions when I
?hY a e i raVe - lle r 111 East ,’ any “ priori prepossession for
this or prejudice against that people. I have no anterior
theory to support and no party interest to serve. But to
my vision all the nations of the East seem to group them-
selves as sections or parts of varying age, and utility in the
most wonderful piece of natural and human mechanism that
the world now presents, namely, the political evolution of
What function is fulfilled by each
the Asiatic continent.
dividnally retard its progress or contribute to the collective
WWmrn 1 * s wheels is to mo the most absorbing of problems
What will become of this great fabric in the future, whether
“VS 3 sptit “
addin,, to the already formidable stain upon tho larger
units, whether the slow heart of the East will still con-
tnme to palpitate beneath the superimposted restraints of
Western force or example, or whether, as has been predicted
some tremendous cataclysm may be expected, in which the’
con<1,,eat s , hil i 1 01106 more ^ rolled back from
, '/ 6s . t ’ ur ? speculations, to the solution of which I
knowledge Uder " 1Sh than t0 sub30ribo “W tamblo quota of
THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES
OF HERAT.
Iromthe first he recognised the enormous
I 0 * 1 * 10 ® 1 ’ commercial, and strate-
gical of the Trans-Caspian Railway, and antici
pated its subsequent extension, and a move to-
wards Herat. After drawing attention to the ease
with which the line might be carried from Merv
up the valley of the Murghab to Penjdeh and
the confluence with the Kusk he draws the
rollowing lesson:—
Herat, already at the mercy of Rnssia, would be placed
Af Jw y f her T utoh - Sb6 might not care to violate tte
Afghan frontier and run the risk of war with Emrland bv
be“ wfiblu 011 f ‘ he f’ 8 t0 He , rat itself ’ bnt hOT terSs wouM
be within a few days march of the key of India and The
occurrence of any Eternal complication might gTve the ste!
nal for the short remaining advance. En® sh me n afe
already beginning to prepare themselves for a Bussfan
occupation of Herat, not with equanimity, because such a
step cannot fail to mvolve war and, if effected must
tainly entail a loss of British prestige but as flip no i
onvard move of Russia in the cLtraf AsiS ga me i shal
not be supnsed if many now living see a 1
station at Herat in their time, ° a Russian railway
the gates of Kandahar (for I am assuming that
event of Russia seizing Herat the British Government
would at least retaliate by an occupation of Kandahar). It
would entail a coterminous frontier. It would bring a possi
ble enemy a month nearer to the Indus and to India. It
would mean that at the slightest breath of disagreement
between the cabinets of London and St. Petersburg, the
British frontier must be placed in a state of efficient defence
against armed attack. It would involve an enormous con
centration of troops and a heavy charge upon the Indian
Exchequer. It would necessitate a standing increase upon the
Indian Army. For all these reasons I earnestly hope
that no support will be given to England to a project so
fantastic in itself and likely to be so dangerous to the
Empire.
THE STRENGTH OF RUSSIA IN ASIA.
With a prescience which has been borne out
by the subsequent development of events in a
striking degree, Mr. Curzon foresaw the gradual
extinction of British trade in Central Asia as the
commercial fruit of the Transcaspian railway.
Of its military value his opinion is contained in
the subjoined extract :—
Finally, I pass to the strategical consequences of the
Trancaspian Railway, in discussing which I speak with the
deference incumbent upon a civilian, though I do not
approach the subject without consultation with others
amply qualified on military grounds to pronounce an
opinion. In this context the first and most patent con
sequence of the railway is that entire shifting of the centre
of gravity in Central Asia to which I have more than
once called attention in previous chapters, the suppression
of Turkestan by Transcaspia, the dethronement of Tashkent
by Askabad.
Then after considering the means of defence
open to the Indian Government, he holds to the
opinion :—
The considerations which I have named above, while they
modify the alarm which might at first thought be excited
by the position and strength of Russia in Transcaspi , and
while they justify the belief that a larger army than 0,000
men could not without considerable delay be pla^d, or
without vast preparation be maintained, upon the Ri. b so-
Afghan frontier from this side, do not substantially all?
the central and all-important fact, viz., that a movement
upon Herat, the Helmund, or Kandahar which four years
ago was almost an impossibility by this route, has, since
the completion of the Transcaspian Railway, become a
measure of practicable strategy, and has thereby more than
duplicated the offensive strength of Russia in Asia. When
we include in our survey the forces of Turkestan, and
remember that an independent though allied movement
would simultaneously be in course of execution from that
quarter, we shall better understand how tremendous that
strength has now become. I am now merely
pointing out the extent to which the relative
position of the two Powers has been modified by
recent events in Central Asia, and contrasting the initial
advantages which they respectively enjoy. I am showing
that while English statesmen have chattered in Parliament
poured gallons of ink over reams of paper in diplomatic
futilities at the Foreign Office, Russia,our only admitted rival
in the East, has gone continuously and surely to work ;
proceeding by the three successive stages of conquest,
assimilation, and consolidation, and that at this moment,
whether her strength be estimated by topographical _ or
by numerical considerations, she occupies for offensive
purposes in Central Asia a position immeasurably superior
to that of England and for defensive purposes one practically
impregnable.
RUSSIAN DESIGNS UPON INDIA.
Discussing the influences which have impelled
the Russian adva-nce, he remarks :—
The fact remains that in the absence of any physical
obstacle, and in the presence of an enemy whose rule of hte
was depredation, and who understood no diplomatic logic
but defeat, Russia was as much compelled to go forward
as the earth is to go round the sun ; and if any have a
legitimate right to complain of her advance it is certainly
not those who alone had the power to stop her, and who
deliberately declined to exercise it. Whilst, however, I
have confessed that on entering upon her Central Asian
career, I belieye Russia to have been actuated by no far-
seeing policy, and in pursuing it to have been driven largely
by the impulse of natural forces, I am not the less con
vinced that her presence there is a serious menace to India,
and that she is prepared to turn it for her own purposes to
the most profitable account.
But he proceeds to emphasize his belief that
Russia does not aim at the conquest of India. He
observes :—
I do not suppose that a single man in Rnssia, with the
exception of a few speculative theorists and here and there
a giddy subaltern, ever dreams seriously of the conquest or
India. It would be an achievement compared with
which the acquisition of India by a trading company in
itself one of the phenomena of history,-would be reduced to
child’s play ; it would involve the most terrible ami lingering
[August 13, 1898.
e for her to ho so u ,
in-ree upon a frontier with a great
f oue party to the agreement
th it frontier- Both parties must
eir influence up to that Boundary;
fart. She has planteil her soldier^
vo were equally bound to do the
nature abhors a vacuum, these
one^ate so small that they cam
:GE POLICY DEAD,
jhe larger issues revolving
of frontier policy, and the
parties to it,
ileces the arguments of the
rence policy :
;nv was based on righteous
3 expressed in admirable tornv
well adapted to us day. ^B^t
.osite are mistaken U th
, r n the course of the recess
le Opposition said at Kirk^i y
if Lord Lawrence was that e
’* mountain. »d
with the tribes by which they M®
ht is an excellent phrase for a
position on the hne ot Lab , main passes into that
must be therefore certain of U absolutely alone, as
country; but if you , bave you do, you can have
my hon. friend opposite would have ) at the very
no such certainty, and >ou may ^ (lefend tbe outer
moment when yon are called u hostimies on the inner
frontier you may be en=a into some relations
frontier We must, thereiore, eui. take ? Surely
with the tribe. Wtot form hM tomJ it
it ought to be possible—and my n aR will agree-
possible—to construct ; n vo lve the minimum ot mtei
that those relations should involve o{ tbe ttib esmen.
ference with the iudepen en - mu9 t have the means
■Rrt three things are essential, w a „ sea We must
of communication by the mam ma r Passes, the Chitral
have the control of the Gomalana ^ ?. ndukusb _ Secondly,
road, and the main pa;-' foreign relations of the
we must have control over the ro s ^ gide witb 0 .ir
tribes. They must not be at hb as8uranC e as to
enemies. Thirdly, "e { which we are a.ways
their good conduct, m return ^ In my own
A X L . .
Although Mr
been priuerpa ly co, huecljo doo 8 ^.^ t0
frontier question an in the opening
sss i.
issjtfjsai--sraas
After drawing attention to ldin and
5 S 3 iHHsia=
or sapped by scepticism and decay, be say. •
« i 4-1,innrit
xr it doe3 uOb
really dead, and the death-blow
•tiesIn this house, and especullj
• other side. We are invited by
m to stand behind the mountains
%S 0 S t t“nWe te Sc>vc.
’ t u wes good—was not, at
policy, and 'th?y have committed
Lcations of honour and good faith
mt Government has been held,
vernment, whether drawn trom
e ,er K puto,e. That, tx**
•eiimstance of the case had been
Lars, that we had deliberately
J policy, and that the Liberal
ale for that.
)T BE REVIVED.
»arils showed why, in bis
;e policy cannot be revived
why the Lawrence policy can
-r’bf these is the great change
yhe external position, which is due
dnk also the legitimate, advance of
rence wrote his famous memoran-
alv inst subdued the Caucasus ,
Tashkent or established her admi-
But now her flag is flying on the
froatiers are not thousands oi
gnous to those of Afghanistan,
efend as if they were the frontiers
those circumstances it is vain and
iseold formulas which prevailed
to the new situation. The Law-
1 to protect India from a danger
parated from her by thousands
suited to a situation where the
m Power are at many scores ot
ites. But there L another reason
can never be revived; It is .tno
duccdin India itself. It is easy
ian opposite to speak of our sitting
Indus river, and there await the
to destruction. But what Goyqm-
What Government will guarantee
ie of India behind it in such a
ice policy were carried out it would
ace blow up the tunnels we have
a the railway to Quetta, give up the
lobert Sandeman. If we were to
can say is that our faces would be
all India. The Sikhs and Gurkhas
to our ranks, and I hope will never
ful millions of India who pursue
in reliance on the protection we
.rn from ns, if they did not turn
r cowardice. And I do not hesi-
d never have the opportunity of
rival of the Lawrence policy which
from without, because long before
,lewe should have lost India from
; I have said in a single sentence,
Warren Hastings, who said ‘‘To
iger, to recede is ruin. - ’
1THICH OUGHT TO BE
JRSUED.
his entire sympathy with
ut the independence of tbe
ing against tbe continued
ir territory, Mr. Curzon
s of the policy he thought
or on the other side of the House
ire to destroy the independence or
.y one of those tribes. We do not
ere with their customs, their
their good conduct, m return ^ . In m y own
ready to pay them handsom ^ mygel{ only
jndgment-andm this matti ^ oQly be successfully
these relations with th con i; ( iential relations with
maintained by entern ^ gi T R. Sandeman
the tribes. We have heard a g ^ bad tbe advantage
in the course of these e . • ( . orre9 pondence with that
or the acquaintance and^longjo^p^^cy ftt k
eminent man. and I ca • y« | a ; <w3 faire, but, on the
On the spot, it was not a policy courage ; U k 1 conciha-
contrary,it was apohey i o ()f COI1 tidence and going
tion, and, above all, a policy { ^ tribes.
about amongst and acquiring the men i v
THE FASCINATION OF INDIA.
a ce v* ** J ^ ^
Midway between tbe two flanks {!* ‘Y ““‘“toring the
rival dilterences I have s, if tb Sbe ba» wide waterless
Sffibs “T bi
human labour and life. I . 1 Amonff her peoples
wmWMm
known implement of iron. She combu e ° wifh-
eterual snow with the luxuriant problems
in her borders may be studied every one ot th P But
the destinies of her neighbours near and far and ^ e
to which their fortunes revolve upon an Indian axis.
independence of Afghanistan, the contmued nationH e t
ence of Persia, the maintenance of rurkish rale »
are one and all dependent upon Calcutta. -Nay, the ran
remarkable if examined upon the eastern side, to
? Wh b, this book I am about to invite attention.
It is from jealousy of India, and to impair the position
which India 'rives to Great Britain in the Far East, that
France has a-ain embarked upon an Asiatic camcr ti.d is
Scin, fronfthe south-east with steps that -th^r
correspond witli those of Russia upon the North-W^ti
The heritage of the Indian Empire has within the last ten
y^s mSe ns the land-neighbours of China and has mvd-
tinlied three-fold the area of our diplomacy at lekm 0 .
liven the fortunes of remote Korea are in a manner bound
uu with the politics of Hindustan, seeing that it is by the
same foe that,in the last resort, both are threatened, and that
the tactics which aim at the appropriation of the smaller
unit have as their ulterior objective the detriment of the
greater. Such and so supreme is the P^^ .^^Hind
the Asian continent by the Empire of the Kaiser-i Hind
Towards her, or into her orbit a centripetal torce which
none appears able to resist, draws every wandering star.
.Inst as it may be said that the Eastern Question m Europe
turns upon the dismemberment of Turkey, so tbe Eastern
Question in Asia turns upon the contmued solidarity ot
Hindustan. In what relation to that problem stand the
countries and people of the Far East, what is their present
political condition, and in what way they are engaged in
constructing the history or reconstructing the maps of the
future,it is my object in these pages i o determine.
THE FUTURE OF ASIA.
Mr. Curzon’s analysis of the Central Asian
Probiem derives a greatly enhanced value from
the broad and dispassionate standpoint from
which he views the advance of Russia eastward.
His own mental attitude towards Oriental poli
tics he described in the preface to a later work
when he said :—
I can honestly disclaim, on the several occasions when I
THE LINKING OF RUSSIAN AND
INDIAN RAILWAYS.
The consideration of the extension of the
Russian system to the Afghan frontier naturally
leads to tho discussion of the much-debated
subiect of the linking of the Russian and Indian
systems. As to tho policy of this Mr. Curzon
holds no halting opinion
I come now to the question of the suggested extension of
the line through the heart of Afghanistan, and its junction
with the Indian railway system at Kandahar. General
Annenkoff has both in print and m reported interviews
indulged in the most rainbow-hued anticipations of such an
amalgamation. He has talked about Englishmen travelling
from London to Lidia in nine days via the Caspian and
Kent ‘ and, though he seems to have been struck by the
improbability that such a line passing through Russian
territory could be utilised by British troops, he has express
ed the ingenuous opinion that it might certainly be used by
British merchants, while an exemption might even be made
in favour of British Officers. The physical obstacles to
such a through line are nil. . . . When we return to
the political aspect of the question we are m a very
different atmosphere. After all, the proposed amalgama
tion must involve two consenting parties ; and if the Russian
Government were to favour the idea, which is so contrary
to traditional Muscovite policy as to be extreme y unlikely,
the consent of Downing Street, of the British House of
Commons, and in the last resort, of the British people,
would still have to be obtained. I devoutly hope that
not one of the three would for a moment entertain an idea
so speculative in its inception, so problematical in its issues
so perilous in the lateral contingencies to which it might
Avebirth I question if even from a fiscal point of view
England would reap the slightest advantage from the
alleged new outlet to her Indian trade; for this would
speedily be stifled by the merciless prohibitory tariffs of
Russ a which already have all but ousted Enghsh caravan-
borae^oods from the markets of Central Asia, and have
seriously handicapped the export of Indmn native produce and
manufactures. On the other hand, Russian merchandise,
unimpeded by hostile duties, would descend m an avalanche
ummpe e •> f a fp-hanistan, Beluchistan, and the
VT th ,tir, • t l„Vd S S town, of AM* and
Southern Persia ; and England would find that she had
stupidTv handed over the keys of her commercial monopol)
?o her only formidable rival. But supposing these views to
£ exa^erated or mistaken assuming commercial profit to
Tu-itnln resulting from junction of radways, and
2?^tin?tLt profii atthe maximum, it would yet be
» fk «« St S
coMolidauoo f Y 8 ™\.sSi?“hS h !n' 1 tto
the gates of Kandahar (for L ££ a9 ™f Government
event of Russia seizing • , t i b
u „ + rptaliate bv an occupation of ixanaanarj. n
would at least retaliate v . 1 Tt dd bnn or a possi-
would entail a coterminous frontier It woiua d ^ ^ It
ble a n “” at th a fth e e r sliHitest breath of disagreement
would mean that at tne 0 Petersburg, the
between the cabinets of .Lonilon imd St P^ffirsb ^
British frontier must be pL® ^ ‘ involve an enormous con-
against armed attack. It rWrre upon the Indian
centration of troops and a ^ increase upon the
^HE STRENGTH OF RUSSIA IN ASIA.
With a prescience which has been boine_out
by the subsequent development du al
spiking degree,
11 extinction o£ Lntisb ti .i - oqnian railway.
coinraercial frail of lie Tvans® 7
Of its military value Ins opinion i.
the subjoined extract :
Finally. I pan. 10 whichflpSk * ith tl>'
Trancaspian Railway, in dmcussm ^though I do not
deference incumbent ^““^^su’ltation with others
approach the subject with ' tQ pronounce on
amply qualified on military 1 most patent con-
opinion. In this context the first _and most P
opinion. In tins com^w “ A; ” Rh i{ ti ng efthecemro
sequence of the railway is th. t j bave more than
of gravity in Central Asia.t * ,. e suppression
once called attention in previous chapt o{
of Turkestan by Transcaspia, the dethioneme
by Askabad. - jpfAnpQ
Then after considering the means « thfl
open to the Indian Government, he holds
opinion ^
The considerations which I have named jbove, ^
modify the alarm which might at first q,® nBCa spia, ami
by the position and strength of Russia n ^ ^an .iO. 000
while they justify the beliet that a larg . of
men could not without considerable delay ne t
% Z."f 'r T»S.pL Kaf S ,
measure Sf practicable strategy, and has thereby^ ^
duplicated the offensive strengh H Turkestan, ^
we include in our survey f °^ e u 8 „ h allied movemf 1
remember that an execution fro» tba ^
wniilft simultaneously be ip couise oi_ __