'Russia, India and the Persian Gulf' [‎17v] (34/46)

30 Proceedings of the East India Association,
military operation. The amount of transport required for crossing
Afghanistan by an army sufficiently large to reach India in a condition
to encounter our army in India was prohibitive of invasion in any one
campaign. That did not conclude the question as to what would happen
if a partition of Afghanistan were to take place. If suggestions which
at various times had been made that we should have a common frontier
with Russia were carried into effect, they would have to face at once
what would virtually be, not a first, but a second campaign, and the
conditions of the problem would be wholly different. Mr. Rees
had criticised certain proceedings which had been taken on behalf of India
in modern times. For instance, he attacked the expenditure at Chitral,
and congratulated Lord Curzon on having reduced it. He (the Chairman)
was one of those who took the middle view about Chitral, which had been
Lord Curzon’s view, and which had been carried into effect. Although
cavalry and guns could not come over, nor could much transport, still,
small bodies of troops with mule transport could pass over and be col
lected in sufficient numbers to overcome anything like native resistance;
so that there was some necessity for keeping our eyes open in that neigh
bourhood, although probably it was a mistake to undertake operations
upon so large a scale. As against what Mr. Rees called the forward
policy, he (the lecturer) had offered a Persian policy, which deserved
investigation. Incidentally in doing so, he had doubted the applicability
of what was called the Sandeman system to the tribes of Northern
Afghanistan. As a great advocate of the Sandeman system, and admirer
of Sandeman himself, he (the Chairman) could not but feel that the
principle which had been adopted was, in fact, the Sandeman system.
Tribes, of course, varied, but the Sandeman system had not led to any
large expenditure in Beloochistan. Beloochistan was virtually a portion
of India, but under the working of the Sandeman system the advance in
that direction had been accomplished at no great cost, apart from what
was spent on fortifications at Quetta, and in the construction of the Quetta
Railways. It was marvellous what an amount of work had been accom
plished virtually at no cost at all. The main principle of the Sandeman
system was working through, and with, the tribes, by local militia rather
than by regular troops. There was undoubtedly a danger with regard to
the new province caused by the extraordinarily different nature of different
portions of the province itself. For instance, a portion of the low country
had always been under a settled administration, and that was lumped
together with some of the wildest country in the world, inhabited by some
of the wildest tribes. There was a risk that there would be an attempt
towards ultimate uniformity throughout the province, which he thought
would be disastrous. He was one of those who regretted the tendency
towards uniformity throughout India. He had always felt that in dealing
with a country of such extraordinary diversity the system of government
ought to be extraordinarily diverse. Of course, it was easier to stereotype
a system, but the dangers were immense. As contrasted with this policy,
Mr. Rees had put forward a Persian policy and a naval policy. Before
recommending expenditure upon such a policy, it was desirable to see
exactly what was meant. Mr. Rees was of opinion that there would be