Coll 17/10(3) 'Internal: political situation; relations with HMG' [‎194r] (387/513)

v/itn the Compliments of the Under-
OUTWARD
of State for Foreign Affairs .
9.1?:. 40. \<U
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[This Document is the Property of His Britannic M ajest^^Goyernm ent, and should be
kept under Lock and ^ey.] P. Z.
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6647
1940 )
\ y To: IRAy,.
,ypher telegram to Sir B. Newton, (Bagdad).
Foreign Office, December 8 th, 194.0. 2. a.m.
No. 630.
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oq Your telegram No. 661 [of November 7th: Position of the
Mufti], • rxM^Y tb 'Ms*
The Mufti*s intrigues must be stopped. There are several
ways in which this might be done, but the least objectionable
is to induce or force the Iraqi Government to take effective
action.
2. Me are, as you know, in a position to approach the
Iraqi Government, whenever we think the appropriate moment
has arrived, and tell them that the Mufti is in the pay of the
Italians, that he is endeavouring to help the Axis by arming
Arab bands to be used for sabotage and guerilla warfare in the
rear of our troops, and that he gives Italians inf ormati on
regarding British troop movements and targets for bombing. The
fact that conclusive evidence in our possession cannot be
produced to the Iraqi Government does not, I think much matter,
since they must already have more than a suspicion of the
Mufti's activities. It would be pointed out to the Iraqi
Government that such a violation of the assurances given at the
time of the Mufti's arrival in Iraq is not only an offence against
us, but also against them and fully entitles them to ta. e the
most drastic action against the offender. Me would point
out that we take a very serious view of the Mufti's action and
that we must insist that, if the Iraqi Government want us to
continue to assist them, they must take immediate and effective
action to stop it. You could make plain that this matter will
constitute for us an effective test of their goodwill.
3. The main difficulty, on which I shall be glad to
receive Your Excellency's views, is to know what effective
action we can and should insist_upon. the Iraqi Government taking.
The Iraqi Government might refuse to allow Mufti any longer
to live in Bagdad and arrange for him to live at some other
town in Iraq under police supervision. This mig.t check his
political activities to some extent, but would not be sufficient
to stop them. Even if special arrangements could be made whereby
his supervision was in the hands of British police officers, it
seems doubtful whether adequate control over his activities
could be ensured so long as he remained in Iraq. Another line
which the Iraqi Government might take would be to refuse Mufti
permission to reside any longer in Iraq, and to twll him that he
must make arrangements to leave, but in that case he would
probably