'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA. PART I - The Persian Gulf.' [‎9r] (22/92)

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inspired by pan-Islamic propaganda, and it may have been due to an impression
that Britain was making use of her influence in the Gulf to give the struggle
then proceeding in Nejd an ending unfavourable to Turkish interests.
In order to give a clear idea of the aims and methods of Britain’s principal
Activity of Great Britain. rirals in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. we have dwelt
at some length on their proceedings and
have abstained from reference to the counter policy of the British and Indian
Governments. That policy it is now time to examine, and we proceed to consi
der it under two principal heads. Under the first head matters of which the
scope is co-extensive, or nearly so, with the Gulf are discussed, while the second
is concerned with those possessing a more restricted significance. The first head
falls naturally into divisions which correspond with the subjects of naval strategy,
naval organisation, naval and political demonstrations, mercantile navigation,
commerce, miscellaneous undertakings, pearl fisheries and arms trade; under the
divisions of mercantile navigation and commerce are included such matters as
steamer, postal and telegraphic services, commercial missions and conces
sions. The second head, relating to the affairs of particular localities, can be
most conveniently distributed according to territorial divisions. The multi
farious activities with which we are about to deal under these two heads were
not all, by any means, directed to the neutralisation of foreign influence, and
some of them had a non-political origin; but they all ministered to the consoli
dation of British influence in the Gulf, and, in the measure in which they did
so, they must be regarded as of political importance.
The apparent intention of the Bussian Government in 1900 to establish a
British naval strategy. 8 “ io ” in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , to-
gether with the proceedings of the Erench
at Bunder Jisseh in the previous year, obliged the British Government to consi
der what counteractive measures would be required in case of a Russian, or of a
combined Russian and French, scheme being carried into effect. The question
thus raised was one to which Lord Curzon gave unremitting attention during
his term of office, more especially after his cruise in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. at the
end of 1903, by which he profited to make a study upon the spot of the physical
elements of the problem. His attention was from the first concentrated on the
entrance of the Gulf, command of which implied control of its internal
waters, and he early recognised that the cluster of islands lying off Bunder
Abbas together with the mountainous, deeply indented promontory of Musandim
on the Arabian side constituted the key of the situation. In 190i Lord Curzon
recommended that, in the event of the Russians occupying any Persian harbour
near the mouth of the Gulf, or acquiring political or naval privileges there such
as would constitute a violation of the integrity of Persia, the British Naval
Officer Commanding in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. should have instructions at once to
plant the British flag upon the three islands of Hormuz, Henjam and Kishm;
Hormuz would be occupied, not with the idea of making it a principal naval
station, but in order to prevent its being seized by Russia, and for the sake of
commanding Bunder Abbas; while Henjam was required on account of the
anchorage situated between it and Kishm, and Kishm must necessarily be
taken both as a base ot supplies for Henjam and because of the British station
of Bassidore already existing there. The harbour of Elphinstone Inlet upon
the western side of the Musandim promontory was held by Lord Curzon to
possess many advantages but to be less suitable, because of its distance from
the main track of steamers and from the Persian coast, its total lack of supplies
and the uncivilised character of aboriginal inhabitants of Musandim, for an
ultimate British naval Station at the mouth of the Gulf ; he saw, however,
no objection to the hoisting, in the contingency contemplated, of the British flag
on the isthmus of Maklab between the heads of the Elphinstone and Malcolm
Inlets, not necessarily with a view to ulterior occupation but in order to
anticipate seizure by any other Power. His Majesty’s Government concurred
generally in the views enunciated by Lord Curzon, but in regard to the ins
tructions to be given to the Naval Officer Commanding they were of opinion
that these should not be of the nature of standing orders investing a local officer
with discretionary powers. In 1902, great stress having been laid by the
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