Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎32v] (64/544)

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On the 2nd June a telegram had been sent to Sir C. Marling
(K.C.-454) to the effect that the Committee considered it essential
to hold, with adequate numbers, tbe road Kermanshah-Hamadan—
Kasvin and safeguard the line Kasvin to the Caspian ; subject to
these conditions they had no objection to the proposal that Genei al
Dunsterville himself or officers selected by him from 1 )unsterforce
should go to Baku ; we were not clear whether it was proposed that
Bicharakoff or any portion of bis friends should also go to Baku, as
in that case we did not see how the line Kasvin to the Caspian could
be held ; we were equally in the dark as to the situation at Enzeli
and as to the means by which the above movements were to be
effected. The telegram concluded by asking Sir C. Marling what
he regarded as the exact object to be attained by British officers
at Baku. Securing the Russian fleet, the destruction of the oil
fields, and assistance to local Government in opposing the lurks
were mentioned as possible aims, but we had not been informed
how these objects were to be effected or to what port the fleet, if
seized, would go. To this telegram no reply had yet been received.
On the 1st June, however, Marling had telegraphed (L.C.-455) to
tbe effect that unless we could count on jangali assistance, he
thought the programme laid for Dunsterville, that is, to purchase
the Caspian fleet and keep open the road to Enzeli, was not feasible
with the force which the General Officer Commanding. Mesopotamia,
proposed to place at his disposal. The attitude of the Jangali was
still very doubtful, and Marling was not sure that their plan was
not to induce Bicharakoft', by friendly assurances, to leave Persia and
to lure Stokes to Enzeli, and not to let him retur n to Teheran. As
regards securing the fleet, this seemed entirely out of the question.
Negotiations could only be carried out at Baku, where we would
only be welcomed for such assistance as we might give in opposing
the Turkish advance; and with the bitter disappointment which
Dunsterville’s non-appearance would arouse, we could not hope that
our desire to secure the fleet would be well received; moreover, we
could only act through Bicharakoff, who was a disappointed man.
The Chairman, proceeding, said that we had then the General
Officer Commanding Mesopotamia’s telegram of the 4th June
(E.C.-464), which said that Dunsterville had reached Kasvin, where
Bicharakoff was under his orders ; the latter would go to Baku and
Astrakhan as soon as our thousand infantry and armoured car
squadron arrived, in order to hold the Enzeli-Kasvin line. Dunster
ville’s proposal was to despatch the armoured car squadron with
Bicharakotf and, later, such other troops as could be spared. Dun
sterville regarded this as the best opportunity which had so far
arisen, and his wish was to proceed eventually himself to Baku,
where he believed w r e might yet save the Krasnovodsk cotton and
the Baku oil, and also secure entire control of the Caspian. Dunster
ville further thought that to send one or two British officers only to
Baku would produce no effect, as Baku expected effective support
from us, and that the destruction of the oilfields was unnecessary. For
the above reasons General Marshall, in his telegram, recommended
that Dunsterville should be given a free hand as regards the despatch
to Baku of the British troops he suggests, subject to the condition
that he (General Marshall) retained control over them. The telegram
concluded with the request that this proposal should be approved.
Finally, on the 2nd June, Colonel Stokes had telegraphed from
Kasvin saying that the Jangali delegates had received a reply from
Resht that Kuchik Khan was willing to meet Bicharakoff and his
friends. Bicharakoff w as not himself going to Resht but proposed to
send Nikitine, who was formerly Russian consul at Urmia. General
Dunsterville was sending Colonel Stokes with Nikitine, and they
were starting early on the morning of the 3rd June with the delegates
for Resht.
The Chairman said that these telegrams did not leave a very
clear impression as to wdiat was actually intended. It appeared that