Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎37r] (73/544)

and that the 217th German division was moving to the Caucasus.
These troops would be quite sufficient to stop anything that
Dunsterville might attempt to do. Dunsterville had communicated,
two days previously, a wireless message received from Baku which
was to the effect that news received from Tiflis stated that the
Armenian National Council had made peace with Turkey, had
proclaimed itself the chief authority of the Armenian district, and
had assumed, temporarily, the functions of government; that the
period for the ratihcaiion of the treaty with Constantinople was one
month ; that, according to the treaty, Turkey had the right to move
troops over the Trans-Caucasiau railways; that Turkish troops
were already moving along the road to Baku; and that, in
accordance with the Treaty, Turkey would shortly begin to transfer
troops by rail to Baku and Julfa. General Macdonogh said that all
this information, if it were true, pointed to the concentration of
German and Turkish troops near Baku, which meant that Dunster
ville could do nothing. The lirst thing to do was to find out where
the Caspian fleet was. On this point the Admiralty were, at present,
unable to furnish any information, but General de Candolle thought
it had gone north to the Volga. The fleet included two steamers
with 4’7-inch guns and commercial steam tonnage to the amount of
over 100,000 tons, a considerable amount of which consisted of tank
steamers. If the Germans got hold of the fleet, which was last
reported to be lying near Baku, they would shortly get to
Krasnovodsk and to Enzeli. He was consulting the Admiralty as
to sending mines to Enzeli, where we would possibly find some
fishing boats which we could employ to lay them. He was also
asking General Marshall if he could get up some 4‘7-iiich guns to
Enzeli.
The Chairman said he thought it was important that an
appreciation of the situation should be sent to Dunsterville, and
that it should be also communicated to Mr. Macdonnell, as neither
of these officials seemed fully acquainted with the exact position of
affairs.
In reply to an enquiry from Lord Hardinge as to whether
anything could be done to stop the German division getting to
Krasnovodsk, the Chairman said that this could only be prevented
by buying or sinking the Caspian fleet.
General Macdonogh said he would like the sanction of the
Committee for instructions to be sent to General Dunsterville to
destroy the oil reservoirs at Grozny and near Baku. He thought it
would be possible for Dunsterville to send one or two officers who
might make the necessary arrangements. 1'he reservoirs were very
nearly full at present owing to the fact that rolling-stock, &c., had
not been available for its distribution. There were said to be
215,000,000 poods available for export at Baku. It would be
impossible to destroy the actual oil wells, but it was most important;
to destroy the reservoirs, and also the 8-iuch pipe lines from Baku
to Batoum, and from Grozny to Petrovsk, as railways and shipping
used oil fuel, and the demolition of the reservoirs would delay the
German troops, who would have to bring oil from Constanza.
The Coinmittee decided —
(a.) That the War Office should be asked to prepare, at once, an
appreciation of the situation, and to send it to the G.O.C.
Mesopotamia, with instructions to arrange that it should
be communicated both to General Dunstervdle and
Mr. Macdonnell.
(b.) To approve the proposal to send 4.7-mcA guns to Enzeli.
(c.) To approve the latjing of mines outside Enzeli, if it were
found practicable to do so.
(d.) Thit the War Offce should inform the G.O.C. Mesopotamia
of the enormous importance of getting hold of the Caspian
fleet, should this pi'ove in any way pi'acticable.